Superpersonalism
THE OUTER CONSCIOUSNESS

W. D. LIGHTHALL

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

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
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Superpersonalism

The Outer Consciousness

A Biological Entity



Reflections on the Independence of Instinct and its Characteristics in Evolution

by

W. D. LIGHTHALL, LL.D.

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PREFACE

In the keen searchings of recent philosophic thought, the keenest that have been made since Kant,—the import of one outstanding evolutionary fact appears to be overlooked,—*the independence of Instinct*. What is Instinct, in its full scope, its real characteristics? Is it "inherited structure"? Or "inherited memory"? Is it blind, or conscious? Is it of the individual or the mass? Does it imply some kind of outside power? Have we keys to understand it? Only beginnings have been made by Varendonck, by Hobhouse, by Thomson, and more by Driesch and Haldane.

The three main streams of modern philosophy of action,—mechanistic, rigoristic, and utilitarian, each appear to miss something, in their attributes toward one important key, the element of Affective Feeling (joy-indifference-pain). The mechanistic schools regard this, like all consciousness, as if it were an adjunct or by-product of a solely physical order of the universe. The rigorists depreciate it as a motive. While utilitarianism, which recognizes its qualities, has fallen into the rear because it was,—on a personal individual basis,—inadequate in its explanations of the highest ethical questions. So the study of Affective Feeling has remained imperfect, or it might have been discovered that it too has an evolutionary history, which is closely linked with the evolution of Instinct. Its value and significance being grasped, it is found to pervade a vast world outside of human and higher animal psychology, and to indicate new and broader views of many problems, and in fact a psychology of Evolution itself. Whenever we experience the workings of Instinct and the subconscious,—which involve affective processes, we are on the edge of a greater Consciousness, to whose behavior joy-indifference-pain facts are the clue.

For the halting thoughts and expressions in which the following chapters attempt an independent and naive elucidation of this enquiry—an effort to "paint what you see"—I make no apology. It is a sketch only. What is here is intended for inductive methods, a direct study as against compilation, a high-consciousness origin of life as against vague Vitalisms, but above all for a wider standpoint than that of the single and mortal man. Yet it does not presume to invade the proper fields of Idealism. It is essentially a chapter of the psychology of a living creature—the living creature of Organic Evolution.

If it tend in any degree to make men think of themselves as more than individuals, and to regard all questions from that standpoint, then these rude first essays in SUPERPERSONALISM shall have attained their chief object.

W. D. Lighthall.

Montreal, April, 1925.

Superpersonalism

The Outer Consciousness

CHAPTER I.

THE OUTER CONSCIOUSNESS

ITS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.

1, 2, 3,—Instinct, in the broadest sense. Man's Inner Consciousness, and the OUTER.—4. Coloniality.—6. Likeness of the Outer to the Inner.—8. Its intelligence.—9. Its care for vast numbers.—11. Its independence.—13. Its energy.—14. Its limitations.—16. Its control of the inner.—19. Recapitulation. A biological entity.

1. The clear inner consciousness within man (and in the line of living beings to whom he is related) is comparatively easy for us to understand. In us, however, there are continually being manifested the signs of a consciousness other than that of the individual and which is constantly working for him, but also for purposes which are not his. Many of those purposes are even unknown to him, except in so far as he may ultimately learn how to observe and study their action. Of such are the beneficent operations of the heart, lungs, kidneys, glands, and other organs; the reflex actions; the sexual activities; the instincts of maternity, of the herd and society, eating, drinking, smell, beauty, the attraction to pleasant things, aversion from painful. Some of the authors on instinct would quarrel with these terms, but the classification is not essential, since they all come back to one principle. Most striking of all is that complex instinct Altruism which, like the sexual, the maternal, and the herd instincts, urges men to martyrdom for others than themselves.

2. The problem is not altered by the fact that all these have been built up to complicated forms in the course of evolution; since they were not only arranged originally, but have been constantly adjusted, and are still

being so. And since (let us assume for a moment) in them are being pursued ends that are only explicable in terms of affective feeling (happiness and pain), which is a form of consciousness, their source and maintainer is evidently conscious. Its conduct is intelligent, and, like that of all the instincts, is based on the same principles as what we know as reasoning. It is purposive, because it pursues ends which we can recognize as purposes. And since it operates for many, and not solely for one individual, and co-operates with forces in the world outside him, it is a manifestation of what is fair to name THE OUTER CONSCIOUSNESS, as distinguished from the clear consciousness within the individual.

3. It is true that parts of this Outer Consciousness appear on the inner horizon of the individual from time to time in that twilight realm we call the subconscious; but it proceeds on its way like an outsider, as far as the individual's ordinary clear vision and control are concerned. It watches him like a friend in the darkness. and not only him but all life.

4. Another striking point is the compound nature of consciousness. The consciousness of every man—and of all complex living beings—is *colonial* in its composition, that is to say it is a flow of coalesced conscious states derived from the trillions of component cell- and nerve-organisms of which his body is made up—each living its own life. This view necessitates the general conclusion that one consciousness *can be* coalesced with another. Many have held some form of the idea. One is stated by Huxley in his "Physiology," on "The coalescence of sensations with one another and with other states of consciousness." But by coalescence I mean something more than what psychologists call fusion. A law of Coalescence of Consciousness, might perhaps be formulated as follows: *Every conscious unit has a faculty of coalescing its consciousness with, and of decoalescing it from, that of any other conscious unit or group, under certain conditions.* This doctrine is apparently a result of the unity of all consciousness at a general source.

William James, in "*A Pluralistic Universe,*" (pp. 176-7) says the "*assumption that conscious experiences freely compound and separate themselves,* the same assumption by which absolutism explains the relation of our minds to the eternal mind, and the same by which

empiricism explains the composition of the human mind out of subordinate mental elements, is not one which we ought to let pass without scrutiny."

5. From the independent outlook and altruism of the Outer Consciousness another conclusion arises. Man's coloniality is not confined to his make-up as an individual man. He is not only the head of a colony of lesser units; but it will be part of the present study to show that he is part of a larger colony. He is more: that larger colony is probably one of a hierarchy of greater and greater colonies, and in the end his consciousness is apparently part of that of the "infinite" Universe itself. This conclusion flows in part from the universality of the law of the altruistic instinct within him: and which is one of the manifestations of the Outer Consciousness.

6. In the spirit of these remarks, let us now try to describe the Outer Consciousness as we regard it. The first of its outstanding characteristics is *its likeness to the inner consciousness of the individual man in its methods of work*. The process of our instincts and functions is not merely akin to reasoning: it is reasoning. It is not unconscious action: it seems unconscious to us only until we reflect on the full nature and scope of its operations. And as said before, since it persistently effects results which can only be ultimately understood in terms of Feeling, it cannot be really unconscious. From its own point of view it is an *inner* consciousness. Its appearance of unconsciousness to us is only derived from the point of view of our own consciousness and body, and we must get away from this individual standpoint. Scrutiny soon leads us to attribute to it at least a lower form of consciousness related to dreaming. On further examination, especially of its higher forms, we must admit that its operations are conducted on principles of reasoning. Then the Outer Consciousness is much more exact and systematic than ordinary dreaming, for its actions are not wandering, but are clearly shaped along definite laws of purpose. Dreaming is largely a (to us disconnected) review of the distant past experiences of our ancestry, providing an arsenal of suggestions derived from those experiences and ready for connection with the current stream of our sensory experiences. Every dream is mostly made up of memories, chiefly inherited and of vast antiquity. All animal life below us is in a state of dream.

And even when we are most awake we also dream, beneath the surface of our waking thought. Dreamlife is one of the spheres of the Outer Consciousness, apparently somewhat as it is one of the spheres of the inner—a borderland of both, and not fully expressing either. Into it enter the suggestions to us of the instincts and functions — creatures and instruments of the Outer Consciousness.

7. As an example of the reasoning method of the latter, take the maternal instinct to care for the child. Put into simple language, it is as if the Outer Consciousness said: "This helpless, defenceless little creature will perish unless it receives certain kinds of care; it will suffer acutely: and in perishing, it will be deprived of a career of happy life." Sympathy is not the only device it uses to prevent these evils: the mother is provided with ingenious apparatus and urgings to serve the case. When an infant is deprived of its mother, the physician has resort to imitations of that apparatus—a rubber nipple, a glass teat, an artificially compounded milk. There is even a remarkable branch of this instinct among others than the mother, in the indulgence with which infants are regarded not only by men but by dogs and other animals. And at least one well-proved instance is known to me where a mother-bear saved an infant girl by leading her gently to a settlement: while wild male bears sometimes play with children. The whole literature of the instincts is full of striking likenesses to our own conscious reasoning: practically, ready adaptability of the means to the end is the only difference, and instinct is therefore thought by us to be more blind than Reason. But if our Reason also be inspired by the Outer Consciousness, that objection is absorbed. All thinking is not a monopoly of the brain. The gray cortex matter is not the sole medium of thought. Nor even is the whole cerebrum, nor it and the cerebellum. In the broad sense, the glands and the cells also think. In short, *all living substance thinks.* That is the real meaning of the unique quality of living substance.

7a. There is only one formidable and, at first sight, hostile-looking class of theories of instinct, function, and reflex action: it is the mechanist explanation. According to it, they are but the operations of more or less excellent machines, and act automatically, like other machines. Leibnitz summarized it in his theory that all the lower animals are automata. The mechanical view of

"survival of the fittest," is one form of the theory. But the mechanical deduction from this great hypothesis is defective: it would explain only the survival of a sequence of unfeeling machines. What it does not explain is the attainment—the persistent attainment—of pleasures and avoidance of pains accompanying these contrivances. It is this which proves purposing, instead of meaningless symmetry. In fact Evolution itself is a purposive process. The Outer Consciousness is a great Directive Power, somewhat as man is in part a lesser directive power. The reign of physical law really coincides with this. The law of will and the law of Nature are aspects of the same synoptic process.

8. Granting to the Outer Consciousness the power of reasoning, subject to the subsidiary differences mentioned, it must be conceded that it is characterized secondly, by *wonderful intelligence*. The inventor of the human eye and ear and of all the marvels of natural science must be of extraordinary powers. It is slow, it takes ages to adapt the instinctive machinery, but that does not lessen the persistent and marvellous adaptations it in time achieves. And even the sometimes more marvellous inventions of man are part of its evolutionary process.

8a. The human frame is doubtless the greatest of these automatic inventions, as a combination. But among the most marvellous of its parts are the apparatus for regulation of special physiological needs. Besides those of autonomous repair of almost wholes, as in the inner germ-layer of the echinoderms, the reoutput of parts, as in limbs of crabs; the compensatory activities as in the case of the loss of one of the human kidneys, where the other undertakes the work of two,—there is the heat-regulating system of the body of man, and perhaps above all in marvellousness, that faculty of the kidneys of land animals whereby they keep constant the proportions of the various salts in the blood-fluid, maintaining them in the same proportions as the original salts in the ocean were in the particular geological Age when the ancestor of the particular animal in question left that ocean to become a creature of the land.

9. A third outstanding characteristic of the Outer Consciousness is *its care for vast numbers*, rather than for the individual. Impulses of race and laws of the fittest are among its methods, but it operates ultimately in the

interest of the whole of life. Every living thing is imbued with the functions and instincts of self-preservation: in most, the perpetuation of the race often overrides the preservation of the individual. Thus in both space and time an unnumbered host are considered. And not only in the past and present—the work of the Outer Consciousness leads on into the future, in which, especially, we can hope to only faintly guess its thoughts and plans. It lives within all this immense concourse, inspiring (subject to a qualification about to be mentioned) not only the welfare of all, but all their kinds of co-operation. Besides the swarming orders of life known to us, is that great range of minute creatures which are known to exist although too small for our strongest microscopes; and doubtless others too distant for our strongest telescopes; and those whose life we have not the senses nor the intellects to comprehend. For the history of thought teaches us that our great equipment, the human cerebrum, even with all its modern aids, is a painfully limited interpreter, incapable of following even a few mathematical factors very far into space. How far are we, after all from Aurignacian man in natural talent, apart from education, or even from the earlier chippers of rude artifacts? And how limited is even our education, granting all its wonders. If we could see more clearly, for example, would we cling to the notion that all consciousness is limited to protoplasm? Does it not seem an absurd conclusion that a molten planet on cooling should produce, under very limited conditions of water and temperature, the sole conscious life in this apparently boundless universe of worlds and systems? Is it not evident that that life existed in other forms in the molten and nebulous planet before it appeared in its cooled form? And if in the planet, then in the system, and in the whole visible universe, and the cosmos of which it is presumably a shred. This field of life with its stupendous numbers of living units would seem to be the logical outlook of the Outer Consciousness, and its law to be *the preference of the mass to the individual in affective sensibility.*

10. Is not the essential principle of the evolutionary *struggle* the conquest of the individual by the mass, of the cell-individual by the cell-combination, of the lesser by the more complex, of the one by the many, of the many by the universe? The moment that two nucleated cells joined their lives and fortunes into the first cell-colony,

the directive power transcending the individual for the interest of the mass, was present. As for the theory of chromosomes and genes, who knows their internal working, but they too apparently obey the law. The logical presumption is that they, as intermediates would point on to the same plan in the workings of the molecule, thence the atom, the proton, and electron, and that each in turn constitutionally also obeys this law.

11. A fourth and the most outstanding characteristic of the Outer Consciousness is its *independence of the inner.* The newborn babe, for example, with all its kit of organs and instincts, emerges fully formed from a world beyond control or knowledge by human intellect, and is entirely a product of the Outer Consciousness. The babe's will and knowledge, not being yet developed, have no part in its actions. When it turns to suckle, its course is dictated by a reasoning and an urge which are subliminal; when it cries from discomfort, the call for aid is that devised by its unknown counsellor; when it smiles at its mother, the art of that powerful appeal is not of its own creation.

12. But more,—the Outer Consciousness has arranged a correlation with the babe, of its whole milieu, it has endowed not only the infant to suckle, but the mother to feed, the family to foster, the air to be breathed, the light to reveal its path, the dark to help its rest. And it has given it beauty to attract its kin. Much of the adult remains in the condition of the babe until the end of life, and every night the realm beyond our dreams resumes its sway, while beneficent operations proceed.

This striking character of *independence* marks it as a conscious entity greater than any human or animal individuality, and should attract to it the most interested attention. It is associated with that other great characteristic, its directive power.

13. It is scarcely necessary to remark that a sixth characteristic of the Outer Consciousness is *an enormous and sleepless energy.*

14. Yet (seventh) there are apparently *limits to its power.* Are not such shown in the constant struggle it makes to attain its ends, in the everlasting procession of its failures, in the horrible carnages and disasters in nature, the bestialities and social cannibalisms of men?

The Outer Consciousness, as we find it, is certainly not the Perfect Ideal Supreme Being. Nor is the problem a question of any such Dualism as of Ormuzd against Ahriman. The problem of God, as Ultimate and Absolute, is a different one and remains left to theology. And the metaphysical question also remains: What directs the directive power of the Outer Consciousness?

We must make this important admission: The Law of Progress—or more exactly, the Law of the Striving for Happiness—is not an ideally perfect process.

15. But notwithstanding its limitations, it is much to be able to say that it is after all a largely successful process, attaining at least most of its ends, and enlarging its goals, as time proceeds: but that is as far as we can go at present along the inductive line, our chosen method.

And we can understand by its success in progressing that it is *capable of the ultimate triumph* of happiness. This is indeed the gradually nearing goal of the Law of Progress,—the reigning rule of the Outer Consciousness.

16. But (eighth) what most interests man is *the relation of his inner consciousness to the Outer.* What a man thinks is his will and his clear discernment are often but the effects of his instincts and functions; just as a jury, listening to a skilled advocate, believes that it is forming its own judgment on the facts, and does not perceive the methods of the art of oratory. Even the clearest and best trained intellects are but following the rules of the Outer Consciousness. Not that it is not something to be clearly conscious of means and ends: and to be rapid and certain in adaptation; and not that high cerebral action is merely mechanical: but that, in our clear consciousness the Outer Consciousness acts, as well as in our subconscious and functional departments. We are, in short, at our best, the plainest expressions to ourselves of the Outer. The rapid adaptations of means to ends by our cerebra are in essence the same as the slowly formed adaptations of the cerebellum, the ganglia and evolution, all instruments of the being with which we are dealing.

17. Every conscious individual, in short, is a projection of the Outer Consciousness, and is himself one of its local organs of feeling, thought and action. For unnumbered ages it has thrust out such feelers into all the places that life can live in or know; for unnumbered ages it will continue to do so. Man is like the spirit of a leaf: his life is in the tree.

18. Dreamlife is one of the spheres of the Outer Consciousness: even when most awake we also dream: the dreamlife suggestions push themselves up. When this dreaming—or, rather, the life behind the dreaming—rises fully to our surface we call it "day-dreaming"—visions composed of elements from past and perhaps future existence. Here the Outer Consciousness is always plainly in touch with the inner. Moreover each of our sensory states may be said to pass into this realm, there to remain vibrating for ages if not forever, and from time to time to return to our inner consciousness in the shape of memory? And so, too, with all the impressions of our racial past in the shape of *inherited memories*, such as fear of the dark or of precipices, or love of the beauty of water, the dawn and the sunset. Thus, out of the realm of the Outer Consciousness,—the conscious life of a man emerges and thrusts its head temporarily through dream into the light of clear day. It is but a concentrated part, an emerged point of that vaster individual,—an organ of it, having a short, but not totally dissociated, individuality of its own. For a period of seventy years, more or less, our clearer consciousness is to some extent decoalesced from the larger: soon it falls back through the dreamlife into the vaster Consciousness, recoalescing, and, resuming its larger activity. The Outer Consciousness, clear, ever-active, comprehensive, will be ours when the leaf falls away and the hour of return comes, just as the babe was cared for when it was pushed up like a flower from the same realm.

19. What, then, in cumulative conclusion, is the Outer Consciousness? As far as the evidence goes, it is no Absolute Divine Being, although the facts concerning it greatly broaden the basis of evidence of the Theistic Argument. It is, a biological entity—a vast composite, living, reasoning being, of which all lesser individuals are extensions. In its enormous sphere seemingly it is occupied with the same aim as we—the universal attainment of happiness and flight from sorrow and agony. It aims at the same ideal as we—infinite happiness for all the entire knowable universe. It has the same striving as we to arrange those material forces in the midst of which it lives into such shapes that they may not obstruct its aims. It sees, through us, as clearly as we do, —and outside of us, immensely more clearly than we do, —the field of action, its facts and conditions.

20. It has other things beyond what we have. So far as we can grasp its characteristics, it coalesces in varied groupings all existing consciousness. Its knowledge and insight are the knowledge and insight of all living beings, present and past. They are unwittingly its eyes and its watchmen, its arms and its artisans. Its life is the composite and never-ceasing life of them all, centralized and lived and felt and purposed and acted—one immense thought, feeling and movement. Its future is the continuation and development of that life. If the term were not too petty, it might be called the Super-Animal. May I venture the word "the Hyperpsych" or, in a more advanced stage of characterization the Person of the Outer Consciousness. An ugly word, but will someone suggest a better. Yet there are grave conditions to remember. Like the lesser biological entities, it seems to have its trials and sorrows, its struggles, its happiness, its limitations of knowledge, its explorations of its sphere. In describing its consciousness we must have frank regard to the long red reign of "tooth and claw"—the regime of the wolf, the tiger and the crocodile. We have to explain how it is that the same consciousness and will govern both them and the highest and tenderest consciences of mankind. It takes much thought to reconcile the simultaneous contemplation of these so divergent-looking processes: yet there is much to say on the subject if we are willing to revise our human points of view of death, pain and outer consciousness and to rightly construct the childhood of the world and the possible composition of that other Mind, just as ours is a composite of higher and lower elements working in harmony. Perhaps, too, in long ages to come the Outer Consciousness may have its partial death, with coalescence in a conscious life still higher, carrying all of us with it, each in possession of its full tide of being. For, as our deeper self, it seemingly carries us onward by infinite stages to a still profounder Selfhood beyond our capability of imagination or comprehension.

CHAPTER II.

THE PERSON OF THE OUTER CONSCIOUSNESS.

21, 22, 23.—*Differentiations.*—24, 25. *Fechner's Animated Globe.*—26. *seq. The problem.*—35. *seq. Argument against vitalistic theories.*—36. *The directive power not resident in the individual.*—39. *Hypothetical behavior of the hyperpsych.*—40. *Joy the clue to purpose.*—43. *"Anæsthetics", "Superpersonality", "Superpersonalism".*

21. The previous chapter led up to the provisional conclusion that the Outer Consciousness supposes a certain kind of biological entity for which we have coined a name. It has evidently a high and complex *personality,* and may now be termed the Person of the Outer Consciousness.

22. The concept of the Person of the Outer Consciousness, or hyperpsych, needs to be differentiated from several which might appear the same, or which have superficial similarities. It is not a concept of any universal Idealism, subjective, objective, nor monist, Greek, German, nor English; not the Stoic Nature; not the First Cause, the Absolute, nor the Universal Father; not a pluralistic universe; not a Neo-Platonic personification of The One, nor of Logos, Wisdom, or what-not; not Schopenhauer's Will; nor Von Hartmann's Unconscious; no immanent Brahma; no Ormuzd, Tao, Demiurge, Weltgeist, Oversoul or entelechy; no Cosmic Consciousness; no "Living Universe" (of present discussions); nor Mill's Limited God; nor Spencer's Unknowable Power; nor Arnold's Power Not Ourselves that Makes for Righteousness. It is not transcendental, mystical, spiritualistic, intellectualistic, nor a creation of imagery or poetic license. Immanent probably it is, but perhaps finite, though practically infinite, to us; and, like the starry system, a concrete subject of simple inductive scientific research.

23. However, as dealing with a coalescing consciousness the hyperpsych theory is related to those of all the numerous forms of indwelling Deity. Yet while related, none of them is arrived at by the same method, nor is exactly the same in result; and they go further afield. Some are related because the concepts of them, although not always so acknowledged, are really more or less founded on the same fundamental element—instinct, in the broad sense, and of the complex variety that may be call-

ed "the religious instinct," arrived at by the Hebrew route. Others are the products of intellectual Idealisms. Some are mystical in origin.

24. William James expresses several thoughts somewhat similar to our theory, more especially in his high estimate of Fechner, who maintained, by a loose process of analogies, that the universe is everywhere conscious and organized in higher and higher circles of life, of which the nearest to us is our globe itself, which he maintains is a living creature, of which we and all things upon it are organs. James points out the interesting character of his views and considers them worth deep study. Fechner's notion of the planets as souls and bodies, and of our globe as the inclusive Oversoul of men, has a certain likeness to the hyperpsych; but it differs somewhat as the creations of Jules Verne differ from the suggestions of the physical laboratory.

25. "Long ago the earth was called an animal, but a planet is a higher class of being than either men or animal; not only quantitatively greater, like a vaster and more awkward whale or elephant, but a being whose enormous size requires an altogether different plan of life. Our animal organization comes from our inferiority. Our need of moving to and fro, of stretching our limbs and bending our bodies, shows only our defect. What are our legs but crutches, by means of which, with restless efforts, we go hunting after the things we have not inside ourselves? But the earth is no such cripple. Why should she, who has within herself the things we so painfully pursue, have limbs analogous to ours? Shall she mimic a small part of herself? What need has she of arms, with nothing to reach for? of a neck, with no head to carry? of eyes or nose, when she finds her way through space, without either, and has the millions of eyes of all her animals to guide her movements on her surface, and all their noses to smell the flowers that grow? For, as we are ourselves a part of the earth, so our organs are her organs. She is, as it were, eye and ear over her whole extent—all that we see and hear in separation she sees and hears at once. She brings forth living beings of countless kinds upon her surface, and their multitudinous conscious relations with each other she takes up into her higher and more general conscious life. . . . Can there be consciousness, we ask, where there is no brain? . . .

Must every higher communication between things be a literal brain-fibre and go by that name? Cannot the earth-mind know otherwise the contents of our minds together?"

The above is scarcely a model of logical form. But, as James observes, "Fechner had vision."

26. To come down to an attempt at connected reasoning: The basic question regarding the Outer Consciousness is: How can we describe a purposing power which seems to consciously understand joys and pains: and especially those of the many as well as of the one? Our answer is the proposition that (a) it must itself be conscious, and (b) sufficiently clearly conscious to comprehend the import of the pleasure-pain results it seeks, and (c) have a consciousness which is common to the many, and (d) overlap, include, or coalesce with, the consciousness of each individual whose joy is sought or whose pain is avoided. Thus, we have contended, arises the hypothesis of a *community animal*, or, to meet the objections to the latter word—a "hyperpsych." We have now to characterize it further and add some other reasons.

[27. There is another proposition which is more remote, but which I would add afterwards as a separate hypothesis. It is: that *all Evolution, inorganic included*, is an action conducted on the same principle as every living organic act, namely *a movement of matter towards a result a concomitant of which is a joy, or away from a result a concomitant of which is pain.*]

28. By the first proposition, the purposive, conscious, single-principled nature of reflex action, function, instinct, intelligence, all becomes comprehensible. Only, we must give up attempting to survey them all—except our own reasoning consciousness—from our own individual point of view, but must take that common point of view which we have termed that of the "hyperpsych."

29. The apparent nature of the hyperpsych may be defined as: the immediate conscious purposer of all the purposing which is evidenced by all the reflex actions, functions, instincts, habits, and reasoning of all (biological) beings, who live and have lived.

30. The second proposition (from which the first is independent in logic) is that the same purposer operates

throughout the entire known universe. This second proposition is perhaps of less strength of proof than the first. But if the first were well established, its strength would be increased. It will be discussed in the next chapter.

31. The apparent nature of the hyperpsych must be evidenced inductively from the facts of its operations, especially the changes of evolution and the workings of the human consciousness. Instincts require special attention. The chief principle of the evidence is: Every movement of matter which is persistently concomitant with joy, or avoids pain, has evidential value of purpose. It will be more fully discussed in the chapter on Teleology.

32. The enquiry is a psychological one. Its question is: What theory will adequately account for the action and development of all the complex factors as they actually exist in their highest developments among men, and at the same time in their whole range and action throughout the history and realm of all life?

33. Various systems of Vitalism attempt to adequately account for them by processes of *gradual integration* of simple elements of consciousness, from elementary forms to higher and higher? But can the highest of these complex factors be so accounted for? Or is a highly conscious purposer necessary from the beginning? There are several objections to the Vitalistic kind of view, whether its first elements be propounded under such terms as "mind-stuff," (Clifford) "unconscious will," (Schopenhauer) "entelechy," (Aristotle) "creative energy," (Bergson) or other of the many forms in which it has been advanced. The usual objections are forms of *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* But this is no reply to simple integration.

34. The reasonings that appeal to me against *gradual integration* theories are as follows:

Gradual integration in the course of the ages *would* account for a mere matter of a *complicated* result in the arrangement of matter-and-mind-elements. Because that would be a mere accumulation, attributable to chance.

It could even account for a result in ingenious-looking, *orderly* mechanisms. Because that is maintainable to be an orderliness immanent in the course of blind Nature itself.

It could even account for such mechanisms being self-perpetuating and *self-reproducing.* They would be very

great curios, that is all: but they might be the results of a kind of chance.

It could even account for the occurrence of perceptual and *cognitive* phenomena of consciousness occurring concomitatively with such mechanisms and of a complexity equal to theirs. Because that, too, might be (or be maintainable to be) forms of occurrence of *indifferent* types of consciousness, immanent in the order of blind Nature.

35. But *it would not account for* the elaborately persistent tendency, throughout the long course of the process, to head toward and attain, results of joy and anti-pain, that magnetic-needle persistency to turn at every motion towards the North of joy. It is this class of facts which alone have *value* to us and alone constitute true evidence of purpose. The greater the elaboration the greater the number of chances against these results, and consequently the stronger the evidence of design in their successes, and the abler and clearer the designer.

36. There is another consideration. That persistent tendency it has been noted (§§ 1, 2, 3, 11) is independent of all individuals and (§ 9) cares for the many. The life of the single cell makes but small appeal to it. Its directive power prefers the mass to the individual. It can be said to prefer the thirty trillion cell man thirty trillion times as highly as one of his cells if we judge by the relative numbers of born, who survive among single cells; and ultimately it calls the man to sacrifice himself for his nation or mankind. Can any mere integration of individual forces account for this first to last direction from beyond the individual and in favor of the mass?

37. An extension of the Vitalistic argument from the lower element as the determining factor in forming the higher, is the sociological hypothesis that the human individual is the prime factor in shaping human mass. Ought not the above reasoning, however, to lead to the conclusion that he is not such a factor? The subject will be treated in Chapter X. Arguments pro and con regarding the human individual are discussed, up to a certain point, in Seth's "Principles of Ethics," but not the adverse reasons given above, nor certain others which resemble them in part.

38. Being therefore forced to dismiss all forms of the view that the evolution of human consciousness, with its

magnificent incidents, is arrived at by gradual integration; and consequently having accepted the alternative theory of a conscious purposer adequate to the ends obtained, the next query is: What is the conduct of that purposer?

39. Firstly, there is nothing (in this form of enquiry) to involve any kind of more distant being that that of a biological entity—that entity we have described as the hyperpsych. For even man has considerable ability as an ingenious purposer, and he is a biological entity.

On this line let us sketch out the history of the hyperpsych as it seems to us, since the appearance of life as we know it on this globe. Omit the characters of crystallization, and of colloids, and of remote indications of organization suggestive of life. We all know that protoplasm, the primary living substance, has as its chief characteristic the power of automatic movement. Disregard the controversies between protozoölogists concerning its exact physical structure, and its remarkable diversity and instability of chemical composition. The supreme fact about it for us is that, wherever, in the course of its development into the line of living forms, we recognize the presence of consciousness, its every action presents the characteristics of a movement towards some objective (such as food) which *follows the joy-and-pain law.* This parallelism of objective movement with subjective feeling constitutes, as above stated, the universal type of living action and is the universal type of willing. All living action is willing, and all is by nature purposive. All other apparent purposes, however complicated and by whatever terms called, are in the final resort but forms of this typical act. This is the method. Nevertheless results show that the point of view of the hyperpsych, and not that of the individual, is that alone from which our higher purposes can be understood. For the living acts and purposes which the latter imply are acts of our larger life: and in them the impulses of many individuals outside of us, and of many individuals within us, are correlated. It is the highest work of the hyperpsych to correlate them and thus to arouse in us "our best instincts"—those from the viewpoint of the wider sentiency.

40. In the lowest forms of protoplasm, the hyperpsych, brilliant and purposive, would find itself striving against difficulties of material. Its aim would be to work out such a mechanism as would permit in the end the at-

tainment of perfect joy. According to our theory, it found in the ocean ooze a highly diverse, unstable material, which responded flexibly to its power of shaping the motions of matter,—a power the internal nature of which transcends our cognition. In it, while it was still unorganized, the hyperpsych was able to find the means of achieving a diffused, imperfect pleasure. It tried all the various protoplasmic combinations as they occurred, and elected to continuance those that proved the instruments of joy. Adding their units, it ultimately attained structures fit for a certain permanence. These were the *organisms*. Later, and doubtless long (but still calculable) ages after the deposit of our oceans and their oozes, the hyperpsych achieved the amœboid forms, "active lumps of jelly," in which the elementary consciousness and typical act of willing are now recognized, and which it sustained in that degree of permanent organization which we call *reproduction*, thus perpetuating and immensely increasing the desired forms. It achieved all these results slowly, not because blindly, but restricted by the intractability of matter. The nature of that intractability doubtless also transcends our cognition. So, in process of time, the hyperpsych indefatiguably achieved all the evolution of animate consciousness—as well as all the vast variety and procession of forms of matter with which its phenomena are associated. From the throwing out of the simplest and faintest forms of low consciousness and the gradual shaping of them through successive adaptations of nervous systems and brains up to the presently developed apparatus of man, they are all products of its one persistent series of purposed acts, modelled on the same simple principle as the typical act of willing, and correlated together by its general viewpoint.

In the scale of living beings known to us biologically, each includes in its mental makeup the mental makeups of all its ancestors. Those ancestors still actually live within us, according to the principle of "biological immortality" whereby each of them has simply divided himself and passed on his divisions (except the sarcoplasm) alive to his descendants, with all the hidden memories and influences of the ancestral history. In that respect each of us is many millions of years old.

41. To the hyperpsych the individual is evidently only an organ, a member of its community, a kind of cell of its multicellular whole. It sees all and feels for and in each,

but with wider vision. To it there is, in a sense, no such thing as an individual: all are one creature: the whole process of subdivision has never obliterated that unity nor dissolved the connection between each part. The disconnection of individuals is an illusion. *There is no such thing as a fully disconnected individual.* We are all connected by the ether. The visioned purpose of the hyperpsych has been from the beginning a clear idea of perfect and continuing universal joy. As the Outer Consciousness, it guides the amœba in its attraction to food, and in its reproduction by self division, the ant and the bee in all their coöperative community behaviour, it beckons the eel from its mysterious birthplace in the darkest deep of the Sargasso Sea, leads it in infancy across to the rivers of Europe, and in after years back again, with the strange sacrifice of the males; it directs the bear, the deer and the wolf in the wisdom of the wilds and the love of their young; it calls the buffalo bull to die for the herd, teaches the beaver how to fell trees and build dams and family dwellings, constructs their bodies as wonderfully as their minds, their communities as wonderfully as their bodies, and, effecting these ends still more marvellously in men, urges them also to the complex endeavors of civilization and culture, to the pelfless call of the patriot, to the scientists' passion for truth, and to the apparent self-destruction of the martyr. None of these urges can be understood from the point of view of the individual: but they can be understood from that of one community being.

It was the hyperpsych which invented the human eye, after devising and relegating to one side the various rudimentary and compound eyes and those of crabs, fishes, and birds. It was the hyperpsych which purposed the human cerebrum, after building up the nervous systems of the invertebrates, the spinal ganglia, the medulla oblongata, the cerebellum, and the smaller cerebra of the dogs and Simians. It originated all communities, the matings and passion of all pairs, the interworking of all bodily cells, the complicated operations and instincts of insects, the customs of the herd, the pack and the family, the loyalties of the tribe, the nation, the empire and humanity. Reason itself proceeds from it, with all that Reason brings to us, and all it will bring. Reason is but the consciousness of wholes, and their implications,—the Outer Consciousness human reason is that consciousness imperfectly present in us.

42. Here we must again emphasize the significance of the affective. The outstanding mark of the power of the hyperpsych is not the ingenuity of its forms, but the successes which it has achieved through them in advancing the diffusion and permanence of joy. From time to time it abandons and obliterates the forms. Pessimistic criticism has constantly pointed to its failures and imperfections. These have been many, but there are two great answers to pessimism. One is that the essence of the primal act of will is at least a power in some degree to escape evil and pursue joy: it is not a complete helplessness. The other is that, through the continuing form of this power progress is actually attained.

43. Pessimists cite new evils that arise at every stage of advancement towards apparent happiness. But they overlook, among other things, the achievements of the hyperpsych in anæsthetic devices. Among these devices to combat pain are the low sensibility, and even insensibility, to pain of the lower animal forms; their absence of imagination and prevision; their great automatism; animal fatalism; coma preceding death; collapse; the quickness of their deaths.

In both men and animals, death in itself is the great anæsthetic. And to the hyperpsych death is but an incident, not an end. Sleep, in its various forms, is, next to death, the most universal anæsthetic.

In intellectual man, however, the supreme anæsthetics can be hope and faith. The joys of these, such as that of the mother in childbirth, coalescing in the common clearinghouse of the feelings, are able to conquer and neutralize the severest pains. Even philosophy can do much; but not so much as the "consolations of religion," where the highest hopes and faiths are the instinctive promises of the hyperpsych.

44. For pains ordinarily consist of two parts:—the original, and its representation, the latter of which is often the only suffering. Habit, reason, courage, fatalism, suggestion and autosuggestion, are anæsthetics. We can neutralize most of our ills if we but organize the anæsthetics. Nor must we omit the arts and materia of medicine and surgery.

45. In fine, judging by the advances continually made, we may legitimately hope to entirely overcome pain in the due course of Progress, which is itself the law of the

hyperpsych. In the "economy of Nature," the hyperpsych has often followed courses which to us sometimes seem open to imputations of ignorance, blindness, or subhuman helplessness, and are often made grounds of blame. Why did it not proceed directly and immediately to its ultimate aim? Why the lower and imperfect forms of living things? Why the vast losses and extinctions of the less fit? Why the horrible carnages? Why, if the hyperpsych were so brilliantly conscious from the beginning, of the ends in view, did it not construct men and supermen at once, without passing through the experiments and the failures of so many ages? is not the reason *because it* could not, because, like us, it was striving, exploring, pushing its way from step to step through the maze of elusive and intractable matter, both protoplasmic and azoic? finding its way and assuring its footing from physical combination to combination. Also did it not have at least this partial justification, that it left orders, genera, species and varieties suited to countless habitats to which beings like man could not be adapted, and which provide the hyperpsych with innumerable organs of consciousness in what to us are inaccessible places. The lives of these in their several regions are all, like the gambolling water-snakes in "The Ancient Mariner," those of creatures of joy. In themselves of small account as individuals, their function is immense through the hyperpsych.

46. As the mental outlook of the developed man is the chief key we have to the interpretation of the outlook of the hyperpsych, let us try to imagine what would happen if the man's consciousness were widened to its sphere. In such a situation the man would experience a vast inclusive consciousness, highly organized and extended, while at the same time concentrated in a most brilliant centre, mobile and sleepless. There is a problem, however, which shows that some imperfection exists in the simultaneity either of its observations or of its ability to follow them up. It is the problem why different minds differ so radically as they do both in instincts and in their application? Why should the hyperpsych, for example, inspire the prophets of Israel to denounce the offering of children to Moloch, and *at the same time* the priests and devotees of Moloch to thrust the infants into the flames on the knees of the frightful idol of Tyre and Carthage,—the horror of the ancient world? The process of behavior of the hyperpsych is evidently therefore not one of *simultaneity* at all points.

Sometimes it even has backwaters of apparent degeneracy to be explained. Its flood of Progress is uneven. Has it not many centres of Attention? and how is it that these are so slowly coördinated? At least however the devotees of Moloch were misled. They thought they were following holy voices. Perhaps the general explanation may be that it is the connections from the lesser beings to the greater that are imperfect in such cases. Those who obey the urge to listen to the holy voices will ultimately hear them.

47. Under whatever conditions, nevertheless, of time and imperfection the hyperpsych's consciousness would operate through a mighty organized system of afferent and efferent mechanism, of which all living beings would be organs. The past of all living beings would be present to it in memory more or less coördinated. The future would not be as clear to it as the past; but its progressing grasp of all the workings of the universe would bring before it an imaginative insight of the future beyond human powers to picture. In each living being, such as man, it would see laid bare all the inner life of each conscious unit, cell, ganglion, nerve, and other sentient contributor to the common life, and would appreciate and judge the feelings, relations and rights of each, and arrange their harmony.

48. We have not the means of specifically understanding its field of knowledge and purpose in the universe beyond that of protoplasmic beings. To attempt to do so is but speculation, though natural and having value. Not only would the hyperpsych possess the intimate knowledge and vision described, but the urge and power to act according to them. From this knowledge come some glimpses reaching the individual man in such forms as flashes of genius and promptings of the Inner Light. And from the hyperpsych's will come such messages to the man as impulses to public service and patriotic and religious martyrdom, as well as all his instinctive promptings.

49. To the hyperpsych some of the problems of philosophy would appear in new lights. No longer would Free-will and Necessity seem to conflict, as they do from man's standpoint, for man's necessity would be his own deeper will. No longer would the principle of "instinct" require to be profoundly differentiated from "reason," nor real

"faith" from either. "Practical reason," the "moral imperative," the "ought" and "moral intuition" would be explicable as "instincts" from the point of view of the hyperpsych, *i.e.* of the many not the individual. No longer would there exist any conflict between "moral sense" theories and those of joy-and-pain. Selfish and antisocial pleasures would be outweighed by the overwhelming coordinated joy of the larger organism. The poor attempts of the old Utilitarians to explain the action of the altruistic instinct by "attendant satisfactions," "sanctions," "the pleasures of sympathy," "admiration," and so forth, would have no raison d'être. Does it not appear that Jesus, who said "he that saveth his life shall lose it," was the profoundest psychologist? Recognition of the coalescence of our souls with the Outer Consciousness, and of the marvels of instinct messages such as those by which the babe is guided, should revolutionize our mentality. At the end of life we should sleep as calmly as the babe does at the beginning in the trust of "the Kingdom of heaven." And if the typical law of all action is that *we all have the power* to achieve the universal joy then the incidents may be regarded as but a matter of time.

50. If the foregoing be in general correct the hyperpsych possesses the attributes of a person as generally understood. It is the Person of the Outer Consciousness. Apparently we can proceed a stage further, and call it the Person of Evolution. But its vast and complex personality requires a differentiating term. May we not apply to it the term "Superperson"? and call its personality a "superpersonality," its point of view the "superpersonal," the system of its study, "Superpersonalism"? These terms seem necessary.

CHAPTER III.

THE COSMIC ASPECT OF THE OUTER CONSCIOUSNESS

52.—Preliminary.—55. A protoplasmic "hyperpsych" suggests a Cosmic.—56. Preproteid substances.—58. "Non-living" matter should be interpreted from "living substance", not vice versâ.—60. Unity of the Subject and Universe.—62. Teleology of Joy applies to Cosmos.—67. Carveth Read.—68. Fechner.—69. Instinctive evidence.—71. Hypothetical cosmic system.—75. S. Butler.—79. Differs from Superpersonalism.

51. In the Chapter on "The Person of the Outer Consciousness," *two propositions* were formulated regarding the nature of that Person.

The first was, in effect, that it is the highly conscious exploring, organizing, foreseeing and feeling purposer of human will and instinct and of the evolution of the protoplasmic line of life, in which we are descendants. In the study of the nature of that line, we have to consider the whole psychology of man, the behavior of all the lower forms of life, and the facts of embryology and physiology. For they must all be taken together as they are, to relate the story of the hyperpsych. But for this object, it seems to me that psychology never had a richer heritage than its new factual basis, won for it by our recent biochemists, especially in the fields of electric chemistry, of valency and of polarity; of the procedure of karyokinesis and the structure of the brain; of our masters of heredity like Loeb, T. H. Morgan, H. S. Jennings; of our philosophic scientific investigators like Haldane, Julian Huxley and Lloyd Morgan. That this up-to-date biology is indispensable to the story of psychology is a conviction which I may be allowed to express as a very humble student of these questions. We are led back to the beginning of protein in the ooze of the primal ocean's floor—possibly in that Pacific Deep whence the Moon was torn from the Earth—where we find the hyperpsych as our Ancestor—the original Ancestor of the whole protoplasmic race,—that

is to say of all plants and animals at a period when it had as yet no descendants, no biological forms of the later genealogical tree, no differentiated body-plasm and germplasm and tissues, and its will and action were applied directly to a homogeneous substance. Several interesting questions are suggested: (1) Whether, by the principle of "biological immortality" that Ancestor does not still live in us to-day; (2) also psychologically moving and directing us in the other way we have discussed, through coalescence; (3) whether we may not read "biological immortality" backward and conclude that, as we were once one with our Ancestor and it still is, in part, with us, we are, and have never ceased to be, in that way also part and parcel of it; and (4) whether, if it could and did determine the movement of the earliest protoplasm to ends of feeling, out of apparent physical chance and mechanic indifference,—it does not also now continue to do so in our purposive acts; (5)whether these thus escape, or march with, or control, the mechanistic order; (6) and whether a "freedom of willing" (to the extent of a power to follow joy) is not thus exercised by the hyperpsych, and by us through it? However and whenever that freedom to follow joy was acquired, we have it, at any rate. And it was present in those earliest and lowest organisms.

52. Viewing the universal relationship of terrestrial consciousness, can anyone who tastes a fragrant and delicious honey, or looks into the interior of a beautiful iris flower conclude otherwise than that all bees have that same taste and that same rapturous delight in that exquisite flower, and that he is himself in lineal link with the immemorial joy of the bee; or, if he reflects that the emotions are closely associated with the viscera, can from them put himself into something of the feelings of those lowly orders in whom the visceral ganglia constituted the sole centres of consciousness, and emotions the sole forms of organized feeling; and that he has even feelings in common with the white blood corpuscle in its movements through the circulation? And if all thus move by one law and one movement—that of communal aesthetic reflex, if I may invent the term—are we not reasonable in attributing the common denomination of that communal reflex to one conscious purposive spirit guiding all the protoplasmic race?

53. *The first proposition*, then, is that all terrestrial life is really one being, the Person of Evolution.

54. *The second proposition* is more difficult. It regards a wider field than the protoplasmic line of life, a field in which we have no visible line of descent, as we ordinarily know descent, and no direct guide by psychology, as we ordinarily know psychology. This proposition is: that *all Evolution, inorganic and cosmic included,* is an action based on the same kind of Outer Consciousness and conducted on the same basal principle as every living organic act, namely, a movement of matter towards a result a concomitant of which is a joy, or away from a result a concomitant of which is a pain. I must make some attempt to fill in this part of our hypothesis.

55. If the first proposition were well established, the strength of the second would be increased. It would be more than strange, it would be logically improbable, that if the terrestrial hyperpsych be the fully conscious purposer of the historic world of life as we know it, and present as such in the primal ocean, that it should have no previous existence on the globe or in the universe, or no other present existence than that of the protoplasmic race and be confined to our petty globe. Indeed, it seems improbable to such a degree that it may be termed incredible. Before taking up the universe in general, we have to consider the problem of the hyperpsych on our globe before the ocean was precipitated from the original vapors and gases in the higher temperatures of the "Azoic" world and before volcanic salts were dissolved in it. And even, among other questions, that of the actions of the hyperpsych on the precursors which appear to have preceded protein, to that extent pushing back the history of the joy-seeking power and of its concomitancies with material movements. For protein is of a highly complex and almost infinitely varied composition, built in long chains of varied amino-acid molecules related together electrically, deriving their energy from sunlight and short ether-waves. It seems to have been preceded by *simpler substances of related nature.* What then was the action of the hyperpsych upon those first forms? And how were they formed out of the previous conditions of the globe? There was evidently water condensation before protein, and did not preprotein substances form therein? Mathews, in his "Physiological Chemistry", asserts that we are creatures of the sun and water.* Electro-mag-

*For a more exact basis, see the address of Professor Leathes before the British Association in 1926 and the comments upon it in the leader in *Nature* of September 11, 1926, by a master hand. Also Mathews "Physiological Chemistry," chapter IV, "The Proteins."

netic currents are deeply involved in the chemistry of life-processes. And our living substance is only a special series of combinations of universally distributed elements, such as hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, chlorine, phosphorus, sulphur, and metals, all forms of the one underlying component. It may be that we are near a great new revelation of outside life if we can determine what are the exact electro-magnetic conditions of life in the protein molecule and the cell. The control of the electron mob and its regularization by applying an electric current to the vacuum tube in the Hittorf experiment seems to show that ionization produces the conditions of the psychic directive power involved in life.

56. Pursuing still further back the origin of protoplasmic life on earth, and the preprotoplasmic situation of the terrestrial hyperpsych, we are still led by the probabilities to refuse the thought that *at any stage, the* purposive consciousness appeared out of nothing. Rather should we next seek for other conditions of consciousness than those of water, protein, and their conditions of temperature. If proteins and preproteins, why not molten colloids and fluids, and vapors, and gases? If the adaptability of protein to life be due to its complexity and instability of composition, then all natural colloids and molten liquids afford somewhat the same conditions. Nor, even, is there any such thing as a perfectly rigid solid, and there is perhaps the greatest degree of diversity and instability in many vapors and gass. And the discovery of the electric structure of the atom annihilates all our remaining notions of impenetrability and rigidiyt. See Millikan's article *Physics* in the Encyc. Brit. last edition, 1926.

57. The continuity of the known universe and the universality of its laws necessarily favor any general theory of widespread Life. For our hypothesis we need not pretend to deal with the knowable universe, beyond the known, still less with an unknowable and transcendental. According to one statement the known contains perhaps 3,000,000,000 to 4,000,000,000 stars of composition and history resembling our sun. And we have not as yet any means of verifying the existence, past or present, of other forms of life like ours, for we cannot even see the "dark bodies" of the universe, on which alone temperatures like those of our earth are possible, but we ought not to undervalue *so strong a probability.*

58. It is well to remark that preproteid life, and present life elsewhere than on our earth, are but parts of one and the same proposition. Preyer in his "Hypotheses on the Origin of Life" has suggested that living matter preceded inorganic in the universe. And Kelvin and Helmholtz have each discussed the implication of extra-terrestrial life through the hydrocarbons found in meteors. We have to agree that the genealogical tree which carries us back to what we call the earliest known living beings fails us for the present. But it only does so because our microscopes are limited by the wavelength of light—one ten thousandth of a centimetre. Yet we know that microbes exist which we cannot see, and what we *can* see is on our side. Nor can we see molecules, or atoms, extensive as is our gamut of known ether waves. To this obvious enough reasoning may be added another: The conclusion is widely held among biologists that "living substance" exhibits peculiarities in which it differs from "non-living" to the extent of an autonomous power enabling it to depart from the rigid laws (so-called) of physics. I would vary the logic of this attitude by rather concluding that non-living matter should really possess these "living" qualities; and I would interpret the so-called "non-living" world by the "living".

59. Our first argument, then is that from *strong probability* that the Outer Consciousness preceded our ocean and carried on its vivid life on our globe during its non-aqueous previous conditions. And this leads to the corollary that it also did so *at all times*, throughout the many billions of bodies of the known universe. It may further be advanced that even our aqueous (or some quasi-aqueous) form is in all probability repeated at some stage of the existence of every one of the heavenly bodies; and that an ocean ooze and the development of protein or its equivalent is a necessary corollary, and therefore the appearance of hyperpsychic life in some degree such as we know it here. Among such a vast number of celestial bodies, conditions very like ours must be occurring somewhere at all times. And before that form some other likely form or forms. And after it, still others. Professor Jeans, Secretary of the Royal Society has recently said of life in the universe: "Or, throwing humility aside, is it the only reality, which creates instead of being created by, the colossal masses of the stars and nebulæ and the almost inconceivably long vistas of astronomical time?"

60. *A second argument* for a Cosmic Outer Consciousness as well as a terrestrial, is that of such idealists as maintain that the universe does not exist apart from knowledge,—which implies consciousness. The deduction from this is that the same general laws of consciousness are necessarily implied throughout the universe as on our globe. The principle so familiar to philosophers is stated simply by Viscount Haldane in his "Philosophy of Humanism":

> "If I look at the people who are crowded into a room listening, it may be to myself who am speaking, there is a fact that confronts me. Into the sensations produced in their respective brains by the electro-magnetic waves of light or the atmospheric waves of sound which stimulate their optic or auditory nerves, I cannot enter. These produce sensations which belong exclusively to the individual in whom they are awakened. I, the speaker, know and can know nothing of these sensations. They cannot come within my immediate awareness. Nor can the audience enter into my own sensations. *But yet we are certain that we see the same room and hear the same words.* How is this possible? Only in one way. . . . There may be *knowledge in common,* which arises from thinking about our private experiences in identically the same conceptions as others employ. . . . It is correspondence in our conceptions thus based on identity of thought that makes us experience the same lecture-room, the same sun, moon and stars, and generally the same world. A single world is before us by reason of an identity in our thinking, apart from which it would not be there in common for us. *It is by such thinking, and only such thinking that space and time themselves are present and possible. Such reflection appears to be foundational for the very possibility of an object world,* and of ourselves in that world."

61. Without relinquishing the benefit of the idealistic view, we may also interpret this "knowledge in common" as a simple characteristic of the Outer Consciousness, an appearance in our consciousness of the vaster experiences of its larger life. And since the idealistic argument relates to the whole universe, it supports the idea of a hyper-

psychic cosmos. To put the question in another way. *How is it possible for me to know any object in the world outside my body?* It must be that there is *something in common,*—some sort of unity,—some identity of nature—between my consciousness and that object. Moreover, how is it possible for me to know any other *individual minds* than my own? The same answer applies. Moreover, how is it possible for me to think or know any *general mind,* outside, such as the Outer Consciousness in the protoplasmic Race? The same answer applies. And as I also have, or can have, knowledge of the entire objective universe, therefore there is that same common something, that same identity of nature, between the whole universe and myself. This is an argument for expecting consciousness in the outer universe, because it exists for me only by some relation to consciousness.

'This rather widely received argument is here included without prejudice to a practice adopted in these essays of avoiding particular Theories of Knowledge, of Reality, of Theism, and of Logic, since empirical standpoints in these subjects are sufficient for our theory and simplify its discussion.)

62. *A third argument* is: that the essential movements and conditions of the material world which favor and aid the protoplasmic terrestrial race are not those of our earth, but are those of cosmic forces, bodies, and regions, forming part of the universe beyond. Such are the indispensable light and heat rays and the gravitation of the sun and moon and the planets, and even the ordered behavior of bodies more distant. These are as necessary as our nearer environment to our existence as living creatures, which, we have seen, is enabled to seek joy by both sorts of conditions. Hence the outer universe is already found fulfilling the office of contributing to joy, and this, we have argued, is the fundamental indication of purpose.

63. We must make one more admission here: that this cosmic indication is not so strong as if the cause of joy were as near and tangible to us as our instincts and functions, or those of the living beings to whom we are related. But the comparison ought not to minimize the great force the fact rightly has.

64. Not only does the outer universe contribute to our joyousness of existence, but there should be added

the great extent and many forms of its contribution, which lend the argument continual and cumulative force. When we consider the constant play upon us of beneficient forces and influences which proceed from space, such is their convincing array that astronomers are usually believers in an orderly government of the universe. Is not this profound impression of theirs rather produced by the beauty of that order than by the orderliness itself? In fact, the vastest wing of the argument from the joy-bringing elements of the outer universe,—and strictly valid in accordance with our doctrine of the teleology of joy,—is in the wondrous BEAUTY of it. It is the infinite storehouse of beauty. It is full of light in all varieties and aspects. It is crammed with everchanging and multitudinous color. It is harmonious and rich in its forms, from the deep blue ether to the star-mists of the Milky Way. It has a powerful magic in its silence and supreme majesty. Its calm speaks the language of infinity and eternity, as we think of them.

65. In this respect,—of Beauty,—it has a share in our view of the teleology of the organic world. Why is it that the *most ancient* things of human experience are so beautiful? What makes them so, instead of their being ugly or at least indifferent? The sky, the moon, the stars, sunsets, dawns, in all their forms, water in all its forms, fire, in all its forms, trees, mosses? Flowers are chosen for their beauty by insects. So, doubtless, are women, children, men, by their kin. While evidently to other animals their own kin have similar attractions. Why are distant things beautiful? Why memories? Certainly all these things have thus the teleological relation to joy. Why these mental tendencies to suppress the pains of the immediate and present environment? Finally, we may fairly ask whether the power of following joy has not been a power existing from "the Beginning," coeval and concomitant with the physical forces concerned in our willing; and whether that power has existed from the beginning, and still exists, concomitantly with all physical forces whatsoever,—in other words, whether mechanical laws and the joyseeking law have not a common origin and plan from eternity?

66. But furthermore, is it not obvious that all these joys brought to us by the outer universe are in exactly the same position as those brought to us by the terrestrial Outer Consciousness,—such as the beauty of iris flowers,—

in that they are too widespread to be intended for man alone. They are even far too wide for the whole protoplasmic race alone. Hence they raise a presumption that there is beneficent consciousness in the outer universe, and widespread benefitted consciousness as well.

67. *A fourth line of argument* is that advanced for consciousness of the extra-mundane universe, by such psychologists as Carveth Read, the learned author of "The Metaphysics of Nature."

"It may be asked," he says, "Why (should consciousness be) universal in Nature? Why not rather as accompanying the activities of those elements that enter into organic life—H, O, C, N, S, P, etc.? For by no means all the elements are concerned: man is not in this sense a microcosm. Phosphorus especially, it may be said, has been thought the essential condition: but the evidence of its special relation to consciousness has (I believe) been overstated. And as to H, O, C, N, it does not follow that, because they have the character that best fits them for organization on this planet, they are therefore the sole conditions of consciousness, or even of organization. And if all elements have a common ground (ether or protyle) it is more reasonable to look to the activities of that as the concomitant of consciousness than to any special grouping of it; and if consciousness exists there, it may be supposed to exist in the activities of all the elements that have arisen from that common ground. It would, however, be more correct to say that consciousness accompanies the activities of that of which the elements, ether, protyle, are phenomena; for all phenomena have their Reality by existing in consciousness.

Now it is certain that consciousness exists in many degrees of fulness and intensity, several of which are known to us."

* * * * *

P. 201. "Having got so far beyond the range of human sympathy as the level of plant-life, the principle of Continuity carries us further and points to some actuality even in organic Nature corresponding with animal consciousness, however vague and undifferentiated. Of course, we cannot imagine what it is like. The feeling of movement, energy, striving, which we commonly read into the operations of Nature, is with us a specialized sensation having its own organs, peripheral, afferent, central. There is a

natural hesitation to ascribe consciousness, not only to things that have no nervous system (for this is not traceable lower than the Medusæ) but even to those that have not the special form of matter from which nerve-fibres and ganglia develop, such as we suppose to exist in simple animals and plants.

"But perhaps ere long it may be shown that the differences between the organic and inorganic are much less than we are now accustomed to assume. J. C. Bose, in his *Response in the Living and the Non-Living*, after showing that under electrical stimuli plants exhibit fatigue, etc., and are affected like animals by anæsthetics and poisons, goes on to prove the same properties of tin and platinum wire. These also become fatigued; there is a threshold of response; subliminal stimuli become effective by repetition; response increases with the intensity of the stimulus up to a certain point at which another limit is reached; response is affected by temperature, and the median range is most favorable to it; some substances act as stimulants upon tin and platinum, (P. 202.) others like anæsthetics, others as poisons (destroy all response); a small dose may increase the response, and a large dose of the same agent abolish it. The resemblance of these results to some of those obtained in Physiological Psychology is obvious.

P. 215. "If it be urged that nevertheless, consciousness seems to be of no more use to the world than to a single animal, since all physical changes might go on just as well without it, such a speculation ranges beyond my power of flight. A world without consciousness would be a very different world from the present one; and what might be possible in it, is not for me to say. That an animal, considered from the outside, may be construed to lead its life independently of consciousness, and, therefore, seems to have no need of it; whilst we, being animals ourselves, have no doubt that, inside, it is somehow conscious according to its organization; this is a good ground for inferring that consciousness is the inside of all Nature, from which plants and animals and men arise.

* * * * *

P. 260. "We have now considered self-conscious reason as arising in individuals in the course of nature by natural laws. If this is the explanation of the individual, it is also the guarantee of the reality of the World. In no

other way is that explanation and guarantee possible; no otherwise can the knower be related to the known; and only so far as there is law can there be any system or any truth. The development of reason carries with it the criteria of truth; it becomes clear and definite, excludes contradictions, presupposes uniformity, and tends to establish universal consent.

Whether, or in what sense, the World itself is to be thought rational, we are not yet ready to discuss. To declare that that which reason interprets must be rational, may be rash and even impious. Discursive reason is tentative and fallible; in Nature there are no paralogisms nor "provisional hypotheses." But if it be hazardous to speak of the World as Universal Reason, at least we are sure that it is the ground, the measure, the law, the judge, and in every way the superior of human reason."

68. *A fifth argument,* not without value, is that of *analogies* such as Fechner's, which are not without a measure of pictorial conviction, being hypotheses of the imaginative learning and scientific instinct of the authors.

69. *Sixthly,*—Last but not least as an argument, there is instinct, or rather, "superinstinct," that is to say, that blending of instinctive with conscious reasoning which we call "the higher instincts," and which, in the case of religion and art, have a profound value. The child, the prophet, the poet, furnish its raw material. They unite in a fundamental confidence that the universe is all our home and heritage. So, in their way, do all the lower animals and orders of life. All are as children in this acceptance and enjoyment. It must be remembered that such instinctive promptings have been previously explained by us as reasonings of the Outer Consciousness. In fact, they underlie our conscious reasonings. There is even that about a superinstinct in which it has the advantage over human reasoning; the scope of vision of the Outer Consciousness, in its complete manifestations, is wider and practically universal and idealistic.

70. It is with decided humility that one ventures to deal at all with the cosmic aspect of the subject. The vastness and wondrous complexity of the universe, the unmasterable nature of Infinity and Eternity, the comparatively small field of knowability, as far as we are concerned, and perhaps most stupendous of all, the boundless richness of detail, cast over these theories a shade afford-

ing no encouragement to presumption. If human reasoning alone were all that is involved, the matter might be considered too large for it. It is only because the idea is that of the existence of a vaster reasoning, that there comes a sense of possible partial adequacy.

71. If the foregoing arguments be regarded as worthy of reflection, the next question is the probable nature of hyperpsychic life in the known universe. On the analogies of the terrestrial, the following would seem fair tentative hypotheses:

(1) That before our terrestrial hyperpsych began to evolve the protoplasmic race, it was active under the terrestrial and cosmic conditions that existed previously (and which may have been even more congenial than ours).

(2) That hyperpsychic action is universal and continually at work throughout the known universe, evolving paths of joy through what we call matter; throwing out as its organs, conscious individuals to pursue them; and coalescing with, and decoalescing from, other consciousnesses.

(3) That wherever, in the outer universe conditions resembling our own proteid ones, exist, there a hyperpsych is at work, and races are evolved having consciousness more or less analogous in nature and structure to those of our own line; and bodily structures on plans more or less analogous to ours.

(4) That among the billions of existing worlds there are all stages, and many kinds, of conscious beings, some very far more evolved than ourselves, and some very unlike ours in bodily forms.

(5) That in time each such race encounters changes of conditions which cause it to disappear; as will in time our own. But such disappearances are but transmutations into new forms.

(6) That at such times that particular hyperpsych adapts its work to the new conditions, and immediately begins to evolve new forms.

(7) That there are many hyperpsychs, themselves decoalesced from others; perhaps as many billions as there are stellar bodies.

(8) That they are all connected with each other by conscious links, and pursue their work in harmonious cooperation; coloniality being a principle of their cooperation.

(9) That their spheres of operation are territorial.

(10) That the purposes, attributes and methods of all are fundamentally the same.

(11) That comprising them all in one ultimate coalescence is a vast actual Conscious Being, purposer of all their purposing, but perhaps not yet Infinite nor Absolute; and consciously related to each and all of them as the terrestrial hyperpsych is to each and all of our protoplasmic individuals; he also being our Ancestor,—the ultimate Person of Evolution.

(12) That the known universe has therefore a vast consciousness-structure operating upon and through its physical structure, just as stupendous and even more majestic, and its law is the achievement of measureless happiness.

(13) That the Inner Light must be looked to for its inner interpretation.

(14) Questions of Kantian analysis can be applied to the hyperpsychic mind, with due modifications.

(15) There is no such thing as extinction of conscious life. In "death" we merely cast off an organ,—this body.

72. Considering the premises, are these thoughts more than reasonably suggestive? Is the impression of the majesty of the mental constellations less than that of the astronomer who contemplates the telescopic sky?

73. Such hypotheses cannot doubtless be compared for exactitude of basis with cosmic physical doctrines like the conservation of energy, which have the support of many precise measurements of mass, momentum, and spatial relations, trigonometric, calcular, telescopic, spectroscopic, chemical, and they are open to much graver doubts: but do they not rest upon the same general foundations of the unity of the known universe and its evolution, and the consequent likeness of the farther and vaster to the nearer and smaller world?

74. I trust I have resisted three temptations to genuine vagueness:—one, that of indulging in mere pic-

turesque and emotional cosmic mysticism; the second, of dropping back upon general quotations from poets and sages; and the third, of falling into terminologies of passing schools and getting lost in the Wood of Words. These terminologies often seem trivial in the presence of the great independent march of the Outer Life.

NOTE.

75. Samuel Butler (1835-1902), arrived at conclusions which on some points are the same as those here expressed. Butler studied Darwin's works (during the latter's lifetime), together with those of Lamarck, Hartmann, Hering, Huxley, Ribot and Spencer, and evolved the ingenious theory of instinct which he set forth in his books *Life and Habit* and its successors *Evolution Old and New, Unconscious Memory,* and *Luck or Cunning?* The broad lines of his theory are stated by himself as follows:

76. (Resumé of *Life and Habit,* written by Butler in 1883.)

"The theory contained in this work turns upon four main propositions: Firstly, that there is a bona fide oneness of personality existing between parents and offspring up to the time that the offspring leaves the parent's body. Secondly, that in virtue of this oneness of personality, the offspring will remember what has happened to the parent so long as the two were united in one person, subject of course to the limitations common to all memory. Thirdly, that the memory so obtained will, like all other memory, be dormant until the return of the associated ideas. Fourthly, that the structures and instincts which are due to the possession of this memory, will, like every other power of manufacture or habit due to memory, come, in the course of time, to be developed and acted upon without self-consciousness. The phenomena of heredity with its exceptions (such as reversion to a remote ancestor, and sports); the principle underlying longevity; the infecundity of hybrids; the phenomena of old age; the resumption of feral characteristics, and the fact that the reproduction system is generally the last thing to be developed, are then connected and shown to be explicable, and indeed to follow as of course under the joint operation of the four points contended for."

P. 340. "the variations whose accumulation results in species will be recognized as due to the wants and en-

deavors of the living forms in which they appear, instead of being ascribed to chance, or in other words, to unknown causes, as by Mr. Charles Darwin's system. The battle is one of greater importance than appears at first sight. It is a battle between teleology and non-teleology, between *the purposiveness* and the *non-purposiveness* of the organs in animal and vegetable bodies."

77. Similarities between Butler's thoughts and the present theory, (that of the Hyperpsych)—are (a) oneness of personality with ancestors, (b) hereditary memory as a basis of instinct, (c) coloniality of the individual, (d) participation by the individual in a larger colonial entity, (e) reference to a teleology. (These points do not imply contradictions to recent biological discoveries).

78. But, rightly or wrongly, Butler does not appear to see nor give any explanation of the connection between all personalities; he does not find any necessity for a law of coalescence of consciousnesses. His teleology is not one of feeling, but of order. His theory of development by fits of lower consciousness does not appear convincing. This view of instinct and evolution he arrived at by noting the biological continuity of the individual and his ancestors through what is now called the germplasm; and he thence identified habit with inherited experience preserved by what he calls "unconscious memory," (instinct, reflex action, organic evolution). Development is to him the effect of the individual constantly striving towards an end, the egg to become a chicken, and so forth.

79. On the other hand, the present theory, of the Hyperpsych, was arrived at by noting that the plan which describes the most primitive act of willing is also that of the action of instinct, function, reflexes, habits, evolution, ethical conduct, and even intelligent conscious willing. And the element of the purposer is looked for elsewhere than in the limited sphere of individual striving. Both theories appeal to teleology. But which is the more consonant with the nature of purposing—a wholly, or largely, unconscious congeries of rudimentary purposers, or a single great clearly conscious one?

80. In one passage Butler nearly approaches the notion of the hyperpsych, but he leaves it unpursued to its conclusion. He says:

"Is it possible then to avoid imagining that if we have within us so many tributary souls, so utterly different

from the soul which they unite to form, that they neither can perceive us, nor we them, though it is in us that they live and move, and have their being, and though we are what we are, solely as the result of their coöperation,—is it possible to avoid imagining that we may be ourselves atoms undesignedly combining to form some vaster being, though we are utterly incapable of perceiving that any such being exists, or of realizing the scheme or scope of our own combination? And this too not a spiritual being, which without matter, or what we think matter of some sort, is as complete nonsense to us as though men bade us love and lean upon an intelligent vacuum, but a being with what is virtually flesh and blood and bones, with organs, senses, dimensions, in some way analogous to our own, into some other part of which being, at the time of our great change, we must infallibly re-enter, starting clear anew, with bygones bygones and no more ache forever from either age or antecedents. Truly sufficient for the life is the evil thereof. Any speculations of ours concerning the nature of such a being, must be futile and little valuable as those of a blood corpuscle might be expected to be concerning the nature of man."

81. It is this "vaster being" that Butler might have attempted to study. On this point he will be among those mentioned in another chapter. The similarities between his views and mine are purely accidental. As far as they go, I consider them corroborative.

CHAPTER IV.

The Outer Consciousness in Ethics.

82.—Altruistic action instinctive. J. S. Mill's "pleasure the sole good". G. E. Moore's "intuition".—88. Kant's "Practical Reason". Kindred to certain instincts.—92. The hyperpsych's point of view.—103. Its wide judgments on joys and persons.—105. Sidgwick. Moore's criticisms of.—109. Superpersonal solution.—111. Lotze on value of joy.

82. According to the foregoing account, the altruistic impulses are considered to be, like the instincts and functions, a part of the process of thinking and action of that wider self of which we are organs,—the Outer Consciousness. In the words of the first chapter, "Most striking of all is *that complex instinct Altruism,* which, like the sexual, the maternal, and the herd, instincts, urges men to martyrdom for others than themselves." How is this view of altruistic action compatible with the ordinary behavior of individuals, which is selfish? This question is in fact that which gave rise to the whole present theory; and the aim of nearly every theory of ethics is to offer some harmonious account of these two types of motive. To the Cyrenaics, the individual actor's pleasure was the sole criterion of good; yet all the profoundest thought of mankind has revolted from that criterion. Why? Because somehow the answer does not ring true to our judgment. Why does it not at least ring satisfactorily to each individual for his own conduct, even if he object to it in others? In general, the various schools of intuitionalists tell us there is no use trying to understand why,—that "good" appeals to a special faculty in us which is above analysis,—that many different kinds of things are "good," that we simply *know* any particular good kind of thing to be good when it appears clearly before us, and that it is beyond our power to define that knowledge. George E. Moore is one of those thinkers, and the arguments for an unanalyzable "intuition" were never more acutely stated than in his "Principia Ethica." Finding some flaws in Mill's argument for the principle that "pleasure is the sole

good," he arrives at the following inconclusive expressions: "I shall try to show you why my intuition denies it, just as his intuition affirms it. It *may* always be true notwithstanding neither intuition can *prove* whether it is true or not. *I am bound to be satisfied if I can present considerations capable of determining the intellect'* to reject it. *Now it may be said that this is a very unsatisfactory state of things...It is indeed."*

Much the same confession of inability to analyze the basis of value-judgments marked the argumentation of eminent analysts in the three separate Discussions of values,—ethical, æsthetic, and intellectual—at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy in September 1926.

83. Was not the difficulty rather that both Moore and Mill were skimming about on the surface of an individual consciousness—their own—for solutions of a matter the roots of which lie beyond the surface. I venture to urge that these roots are to be found in our Outer Consciousness. There our vaster mind has ever before it the whole coalesced personality of all terrestrial sentient beings. The Selfish of the human personality disappears in that coalescence with the wider Personality; it becomes indeed what we call the Unselfish; it changes its objective; it casts aside the mean, the small, the temporary, the socially destructive, the gross; it adopts the altruistic, the "universal", the "eternal", the true (which is desirable because of its eternal quality), the socially constructive, the ideal of Love, the ideal of perfect happiness for all sentient being.

84. There is another form of Intuitionalism which raises a deeper objection than Moore's would make to our theory. It is the Intuitionalism of "the Practical Reason." Why, it might say, should it be necessary to posit an extra-human mind when the human mind itself contains all that is needed to explain the notions of "good" and "right"? Man's intellect can of itself impartially recognize the value of all existing persons and, applying the idea of universal justice, allot to each of them his share, his interest, his right.

85. But such an explanation does not afford a spring of action. There is no reason why justice, in itself, should touch us and make us act and feel impersonally. If that were all, the problem would remain where it was with the Cyrenaics. But fortunately, we are touched,—a spring

of action rises from somewhere and carries us further than any simple contemplation of justice. This spring of action I conceive to be the one sole spring of all action, the desire of a person for its own happiness. And none such can primarily seek the happiness of the many except the spirit of the many—the hyperpsych. None other can see justice at first hand. The notion of justice in the individual is derivative and instinctive.

86. The conclusion that an instinctive element is at work might seem less well-founded were it not that instinct enters so largely into kindred operations within us. We have mentioned the maternal, herd, and reproductive forms. These become still more striking as an argument concerning human conduct when we see them guiding the higher animals nearest to man, such as the apes, wolves, and the Newfoundland dog, with his propensities for life-saving and the protection of children. It is quite true that the process of the Outer Consciousness is very imperfect in the animal world in the matter of altruism. But it advances rapidly as its latest organs, individual human beings, become better and better trained and equipped to follow up these problems and to adjust their world to the truer expression of the hyperpsych. And as the mind of the hyperpsych, in other instincts and functions works by reasoning, which to us seems unconscious, so also it works in the case of altruism. It sees the many, not the local one, —and that one is itself a colonial unity of consciousness such as we. It wills, for the many; it supplies the required personal spring of action;—and then it wells up in us as the altruistic instinct, the so-called "inexplicable intuition."

87. What is the "many" thus seen by the hyperpsych? Not merely a vague crowd: but the whole protoplasmic race, existing and future, innumerable and extending up to an unknown which to us would be "infinite" and "infinitely" superior.

88. The various forms of Intuitionalism, although insufficient, represent a very real aspect, in that they give a true picture of how right and wrong appear when they arise at the surface of our consciousness. But they do not give a complete explanation, and no theory based on what appears on the surface can supply a complete explanation or entirely dispose of happiness-theory. The happiness-theories themselves also fall short. It is only the facts of the Outer Consciousness which seem to ex-

plain the anomaly. Yet both Intuitionalism and Utilitarianism significantly form excellent working hypotheses. As for the intuitionalism of the Practical Reason of Kant and Thomas Whittaker, they only need to be moved back a step,—to the mind of the hyperpsych in place of that of man.

89. Altruism, even in its most clearly reasoned forms, always retains at least a part of its instinctive basis: for it is always hyperpsychic in its *point of view.* Its *impulse* also is always hyperpsychic. And when its judgments are exercised, as they usually are, "below the threshold" of our consciousness, it is always totally instinctive.

90. By way of illustration of the process, let us imagine that a time has come when each of us shall have passed over to the hyperpsychic life, and when we shall look clearly from that standpoint at the questions now under discussion. We may then know, in their relative values, the components and organs of that great conscious colony of persons and shall see our former selves as each but one of them. We shall also then know better the stupendous depths and heights of the joy-and-pain scale, the stupendous values for which the moral cause stands, the inexpressible meaning of the struggle, the dreadfulness of loss, the solemn bliss of universal achievement, and the momentousness of the universal striving. We shall feel with the profoundly intimatest touch of reality that inner unity which we can here but haltingly glimpse, through our dark and puny slits of senses, as a "community interest." What we here ineffectually try to descry as the common element of comparison, and the basis of judgments of one "good" with another, and of one "right" of a person against another, would be liquidated on the clearing-ground of their one consolidated consciousness.

91. On what basis would these comparisons be made? In our human ethics, constant disputes are proceeding over the difficulties of comparing different happinesses and pains by *quantity* and *quality.* Bentham's maxim that "the greatest happiness to the greatest number" is the standard is *not* too easy of application. For what is "quantity" of pleasure? And why not "quality"? And is number also not a factor? How are these to be defined?

[I use the term "pleasure" reluctantly, even though it is customary in ethics, because it has too many popular connotations with the narrow and gross. I would prefer

to discard it and employ "joy" and "happiness." But its use is firmly established.]

Number can obviously only be applied with exactitude to equal units. Are all human units really of the same value? Hardly so, in this life. In case of a shipwreck what units should the fellow-passenger feel have the best right to be saved? May it not be those lives with a valuable future, such as the children, the married, the highly intelligent, the healthy, those of the best philanthropic tendencies? And as against them, the aged, the feebleminded, the useless, the depraved, the criminal? How ought the choice to be made?

92. From the hyperpsychic point of view it would be simple? All are equal: the accidental qualities of this life are accidental trifles: but instinctive altruism would urge the strong to save the weak, the women, the children and the sick; and the superhuman philosophy of self-sacrifice would say "he that saveth his own life shall lose it."

93. "Rights of persons" suggest all animate forms of life. Until a few hundred years back the rights of animals have counted for as much or more in the minds of mankind than those of men themselves. All primitive religion was animalistic: and even the great religions of Egypt, Babylonia, India, China, were full of forms of it: in India to-day it extends to the smallest insect life. But evidently Nature is not absurdly afraid of terrestrial death. To the hyperpsych "death" and "life" are part of one story.

94. But to return to quantity and quality and their comparison. *Intensity,* either simple or complex, is evidently one element of quantity. At its lowest, let us say we enjoy a weak taste of the flavor of a good orange. A stronger taste of the same orange is evidently preferable. An extraordinary taste may be better still. A delirium of a simple joy is yet a further advance in the scale of quantity. But when we are carried along for a moment by the delight of an exquisite perfume we may ask ourselves whether there is not more than simple intensity: whether the intensity is not added to by quality. And this raises the problem of what quality is and of its relation, if any, to quantity.

95. In the Utilitarian interpretation, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," the element of number

of persons accepted as at least a major element, and for simple pleasures it offers a rough-and-ready arithmetical addition. Where the effects on individuals are different, the numerical calculation is less easy; yet it is something of a guide as far as it goes. Besides intensity and numbers, there is *duration* which may be regarded as quantity in time, for purposes of comparison. With it must be associated *repetition* and *degree of persistence.* Next comes *simultaneity* of several sensations in the same consciousness or consciousnesses; together with their variations of intensity, duration and repetition. And in practice, all kinds of pleasures and pains.

96. We now come to quality. Moore asserts that Mill (who contends for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number") makes a fatal admission in acknowledging that quality is to be considered as well as quantity; and that consequently happiness does not present an intelligible criterion of "good." The intellectual pleasures of art, music, knowledge, are to a well-informed man preferable to those of eating. Moore (Principia Ethica, pp. 77-78) says: "Now it is well known that Bentham "rested his case for Hedonism on 'quantity of pleasure' "alone. It was his maxim that 'quantity of pleasure being "equal', pushpin is as good as poetry.' And Mill appar- "ently considers Bentham to have proved that nevertheless "poetry is better than pushpin; that poetry does produce "a greater quantity of pleasure. 'But,' says Mill, 'the "Utilitarians might have taken the other and as it may be "called higher ground with entire consistency. Now we "see from this that Mill acknowledges 'quality of pleasure' "to be another or different ground for estimating pleasures "than Bentham's 'quantity'," and that Mill fears "he might 'deserve to be called a pig'." Mill's test is 'the preference of most people who have tested both.' And Moore contends that Mill's test is just a judgment of an intuitional kind,—"a judgment utterly independent of all considera- "tions as to whether one thing is more pleasant or more "desirable than another. This is to admit that good is "good and indefinable."

97. But is "quality" of good fundamentally different from "quantity"? In what does quality consist? We use such terms of quality as "finer," "higher," "nobler," "refined," as against "grosser," "lower," "baser," "coarse."

Introducing the ethical element—properly the altru-

istic—we use "virtuous," "holy," "unselfish" as against "vicious," "sinful," "selfish."

We ought first to distinguish between what affects the individual alone. In this category, what does "finer" mean?—the individual being supposed to be absolutely alone in the universe. Is poetry better than pushpin to him? (Of course bad poetry is worse than good pushpin: we must take standard samples under standard circumstances). Poetry is "finer" "more noble," "more refined." What does that mean? Is it not that more and broader avenues of consciousness are agreeably stirred by poetry? The pleasures of the latter are chiefly derived from represented images of activities (brought together through the poet's skill); while those of pushpin are direct sensations of fewer and much smaller activities. On the stage of the small circle of pushpin consciousness they are as large as the far more numerous and varied activities represented by poetry. But the true stage is that of the hyperpsychic consciousness. In that freedom of the soul we live a vaster life and breathe a larger air: the smallness of the pushpin life is seen in its true perspective; we judge the situation by instinct.

98. So much for the field which concerns, or seems to concern, only the individual. If that self-centred level were all, the poet might still be open to the reproach of the gilded pig. But poetry, having opened the door of a larger world, meets there the impulses called "generous" as well as those of power and beauty. In that larger world rings the call of altruism, the impulse to chivalry and self-sacrifice,—elements in the most ennobling poetry and art.

There are mixtures which bring out the contrast. If poetry, or even pushpin, be mixed with what is wicked, anti-altruistic, malevolent,—snatching away the happiness of another to devour it oneself—especially if that other be weak or poor—then ugliness enters into and nullifies the total, and it cannot stand the larger view.

Do not these considerations show that *quality is a form of quantity*,—that it consists of quantities displayed and commingled in representation. And in the altruistic forms those represented joys are those of other persons.

99. In short, must we not, as said above, seek for a form of consciousness where all these contrasted bodies of elements can meet for comparison on one same basis,

And is not that form the instinctive consciousness behind our own—the mind of the hyperpsych?

100. I venture to advance another point,—that presentations and representations are the same things only in different stages of emergence into our consciousness. They all have their base in the subconscious, or as I prefer to call it the Outer Consciousness.

101. Perhaps the mind of the individual is sufficient for the simpler judgments which only affect himself,—though even then he acts as organ of the hyperpsych, and should obey his instincts of self-preservation and preservation of the race.

102. In the consciousness of the hyperpsych, uniting all subordinate personalities, by coalescence of consciousnesses, they each are seen as parts of it, are weighed and the result makes its appearance in the human conscience. Since instinct is a form of reasoning, only that the reasoning is that of the hyperpsych, the product is really a reasoned judgment and not an indefinible intuition.

103. The reasoned making of ethical judgments is not always easy in practice. The facts have first to be made certain; they have to be separately weighed and then coordinated. Doubts often cloud the thinking. Hence guidance is sought from moral codes and guides, and these differ much in value. Yet ethical science is a precious acquisition of real service, and built upon a greater accumulation of experience, learning and analysis than any other science in the world. In its development and practical services some minds too possess or attain superior proficiency in ethical judgments, just as eminent jurists acquire notable ability in the related science of law, by a combination of skill, acumen and diligence, together with the foundation of profound instinct. The process has a resemblance to physical weighing, where some experts can by practice and native skill, weigh familiar substances with amazing correctness by the hand or eye.

The rapid action of altruistic decisions in times of emergency is one of the marks of their instinctive origin: similar to the rush of the Newfoundland dog to save a drowning child, or of mothers among the higher animals to save their offspring. Even an infant will scream its disapproval at whoever hurts its mother. A dog will spring at whoever strikes its master.

104. The following passages from Moore* will make clearer the requirements which the argument of this paper assumes to meet:

After combatting Mill, he quotes Sidgwick as follows:

"The passages in Methods of Ethics to which I shall "now invite attention are to be found in I. IX. 4 and in III. "XIV. 3-5. The first of these two passages runs as "follows: 'I think that if we consider carefully such results "as are commonly judged to be good, other than qualities "of human beings, we can find nothing that on reflection "appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation "to human existence, or at least to some consciousness or "feeling,—*e.g* beauty in external nature apart from con- "templation of it by human beings. . . . . A man may "devote himself to their production without any considera- "tion of the persons who are to contemplate them. . . . . "Still, as soon as the alternatives are clearly apprehended "it will I think be generally held that beauty, knowledge, "and other ideal goods, as well as all external material "things, are only to be reasonably sought by men in so far "as they conduce (1) to Happiness, or (2) to the Perfection "of Excellence of human existence. . . . . I say human, for "most Utilitarians consider the pleasure and freedom "from pain of the inferior animals to be included in "the happiness which they take as the right and proper "end of conduct. . . . . Nor again, can we include as a "practical end the existence of beings above the human. ". . . . . I shall therefore confidently lay down that if there "be any good other than happiness to be sought by man, "as an ultimate practical end, it can only be the goodness, "perfection or excellence of human existence. . . . . No one "would consider it rational to aim at the production of "beauty in external nature apart from any possible con- "templation of it by human beings'."

105. Moore. pp. 83-4, takes exception to these propositions of Sidgwick, and holds a world of beauty to be better than one of foulness even if no one knew it to exist "because it is better in itself." He holds that "if this be admitted, it would then be our positive duty to make the world more beautiful." (Is he not here appealing to an instinct, in other words the Outer Consciousness?)

106. On page 85 he quotes Sidgwick III. XIV. §§ 4-5: "I appeal to his" (the reader's) "*intuitive judgment* after

*Prin. Ethica. Chapter on "Hedonism." p. 81.

"due consideration of the question when fairly placed "before it: and secondly, to a *comprehensive comparison "of the ordinary judgments of mankind.* . . . . . But we may "urge not only that all these elements of 'ideal good' are "productive of pleasure in various ways: but also that "they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, "roughly speaking in proportion to the degree of this "productiveness. This seems obviously true of Beauty, "and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of ideal." (Sidgwick then applies the same arguments to Freedom, Knowledge, and Virtue.)

Moore disputes all this.

107. On page 101 he quotes Sidgwick further: "*the "relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence is "the profoundest problem of Ethics.*" (III. XIII. §5. n.1.) . . . "Even if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle "of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own "happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to "sacrifice to any other: and *that therefore harmony be- "tween the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational "Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated* if morality "is to be made completely rational. This latter view is "that which I myself hold." (Last chapter, §1). Then "Sidgwick says "the inseparable connection between Utili- "tarian Duty and the greatest happiness of the individual "who conforms to it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated "on empirical grounds (Ibid §3) . . . . . To assume the "existence of such a Being as God, by the concensus of "theologians is conceived to be would ensure the required "reconciliation, since the Divine Sanctions of such a God, "would of course suffice to make it always everyone's "interest to promote universal happiness to the best of "his knowledge."

Moore considers this a fallacy (p. 103): "That a single "man's happiness should be the *sole good* and that also "everybody's happiness should be the *sole good* is a con- "tradiction which cannot be solved by the assumption that "the same conduct will secure both."

108. The theory of the Person of the Outer Consciousness, meets the difficulties raised by both these equally keen disputants.

It solves Sidgwick's "profoundest problem of ethics," it offers harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence; it rests upon a basis of

experience deeper than that of human empiricism; it supplies a sufficient Being beyond man—although an intermediate one; it shows how "the single man's happiness" can be, and is, the same as "everybody's happiness," and how the same conduct secures both without any contradiction, it removes the arena from a superficial consciousness to a deeper, it is based solely on an analysis of the facts of thought and action and not on any unscientific method or pretension. It answers by one and the same solution the instinctive requirements of Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick and Moore. And is not every true ethicist such instinctively? This fact is very indicative.

109. It is not a purpose of the present sketch to specially analyze the conscience-instinct. Evidently such an analysis might have much to tell, being founded in a larger life and related to existences not confined to human interests and history. The hyperpsych is not the fossil of a dead past. It is a living spirit today.

NOTE

Lotze on the Value of Joy.

"Nothing else affirms itself so unconditionally and so immediately in respect of its value as Happiness. Only it has valid claim as the ultimate thing to be realized. Only in regard to it is the question absurd why it instead of unhappiness, must be the final purpose of the world. . . .

110. "The above-mentioned view is combated in vain from the side of ethical Rigorism, which, through its well-known undervaluation of all 'pleasure,' always, in the practical domain, regards nothing but disinterested obedience to the universal commands of duty as ethical; and therefore in the religious domain also would not, in any case, be disposed to acknowledge 'supreme blessedness' as the final purpose of the world,—perhaps not, even with any readiness, even as a tolerable consequence of that purpose. With respect to this point, we briefly remark as follows: if obedience or disobedience to an ethical law were to occasion not a trace of pleasure or pain to any sensitive being in the world, whether God, angels or men—it would be utterly incomprehensible why it is just the obedience and not the disobedience to the law that must have an obligatory force, since, after all, the effects of the two modes of conduct consist only in the production of

different states of facts, one of which would be as indifferent as the other. In a word, it is impossible to understand what is to constitute the 'value' of any action if its results are not able to produce some 'Good' somewhere in the world, or to increase the sum of already existing 'Good' after.

"But while we designate Things, States and Events as 'Good,' it is, after all, only in so far as they are means for obtaining the only real and substantial good, and this latter always exists only in pleasure of some sensitive spirits completely apart from the realm of actuality.

"No Ethics can avoid having regard to a purpose that is final and in itself of absolute value. No matter to what extent many rigorous systems formulate their highest ethical laws, apparently without any such regard, still, in addition to the assurances that they are the highest laws, the conclusion must always be supplied: What, then, would be the result, if these laws were not obeyed?

"The foregoing assertions do not degrade morals. It is not meant by them that the direct endeavor after happiness—and that, too, after one's own happiness—should be the ethically praiseworthy motive of our action. On this point our conscience gives us sufficient instruction, since it interprets the endeavor as in itself considered indifferent and merely natural, but, on the contrary, interprets as ethically laudable only the endeavor to secure the happiness for others. Thus (as might be further proved) the command of 'benevolence is, among all ethical commands, really the fundamental one, and only upon the assumption of it do all the rest receive their obligatory value.

"On the other hand, in seeking a coherent view of the world, we have a speculative interest in the fact that the ethical commands, which we are able in practice to obey without any future question as to their origin, are not wholly lacking in coherence with the arrangement of the world. That such arrangement therefore be reckoned to the account of the final repose of blessedness is a speculative claim which we set up in the interest, to a certain extent, of our reverence for the world, but not for the satisfaction of our own wishes for happiness. We are naturally unable to avoid including our own welfare also in this comprehensive final purpose.

"The foregoing are perhaps the incentives which, in religious thought, have led to this doctrine of blessedness.

From these incentives are distinguished, and not to their advantage, at least, as regards the intention, the philosophical systems which only in a practical way set up claims upon our obedience to universal ethical law, but speculatively give us no enlightenment with respect to the ultimate end to which properly this ceaseless expenditure of ethical energy is to lead.

"Certainly, the laudation alluded to above holds good only of the intention and not of the performance of this religious opinion. It is wrecked rather in the attempt actually to deduce of the present from the supreme purpose of blessedness.

"The first objection certainly might be disregarded, namely, why this purpose could be accomplished at all only as a result of a course of the world; and why it could not be accomplished as well from the very beginning.

"At the foundation of such a question there really lies the logical error of regarding the conception of blessedness or of pleasure in general in this universal sense of it as something realizable.

"But the pleasure that is without content can no more exist than a sensation of 'color in general,' which were neither green nor blue. 'Every pleasure' is rather an altogether determinate one, which is distinguished, as to its intensity and coloring, from others, and in both respects is determined by the nature of the content of which it is an enjoyment.

"Hence it may be made evident that we are utterably unable to form any real idea of a blessedness without content, although we can form the name of it; that it is capable of realization rather only upon the supposition that there are actual relations of some sort which constitute the object of enjoyment in this pleasure; and, finally, that even these relations cannot be as they will, but together must form an orderly arrangement of the world."—*Microcosmus.*

CHAPTER V.

The Teleology of the Outer Consciousness.

112.—Historical.—114. Hicks distinguishes "eutaxiology" (order-teleology) from Design.—115. Teleology of Joy the sole true Argument for Design.—117. Significance of joy and pain.—118. Persistent joy the proof of purpose. —119. Application to evolutionary design.—122. Identity of evolutionary action with willing.—126. Argument from Order insufficient of itself.—129. All joys prove purpose. —130. James Lindsay's review.—131. Lankester's physicism.

111. In dealing with the various aspects of the Outer Consciousness taken up in the four preceding chapters—General, Personal, Cosmic, and Ethical,—it was was evident that they are based upon a special teleology. The concept itself of the Outer Consciousness was arrived at by noting that the bodily functions and instincts, together with many other contrivances and operations within and without the individual are beneficent towards him, yet do not proceed from his own intelligence nor will. Hence they are attributed to a conscious intelligence and personality outside the individual, of such nature as would account for the same sort of beneficent operations for all other individuals. Now this teleology differs in certain aspects from the principles of all other developed coherent systems.

112. To the Greeks and Romans, teleology signified the consideration of "the admirable order of the cosmos and the contrivances of the human frame," (two very different things), concluding to intelligent governance. Their range of scientific knowledge was too restricted to permit of extensive evidences, in a sphere based upon evidences.

The schoolmen of the Middle Ages, for the same reason, were still less definite. "Certain things without intelligence, as natural bodies," wrote Aquinas, "work toward a purpose."

Later "natural theologians"—and they became numerous—are typified by Isaac Newton, who was awed by "the

wonderful uniformity in the planetary system"; by Derham, who rejoiced that "the great God could so admirably provide for the whole animal world everything serviceable to it"; and by Paley, who "took his stand on human anatomy," and said, "our business is with mechanism."

113. In 1883, an American professor, L. E. Hicks, now almost forgotten, in his work "Critique of Design-Arguments," pointed out that two different subjects of study were being confused under the notion of teleology—the Argument from Design or Purpose, and the Argument from Order in the Universe, to which latter he then gave the name "Eutaxiology." His own distinctions between the two arguments and their spheres were open to considerable criticism, but his main point—that there is a difference—has won its way. He says that formerly "natural theologians" advanced the theory that particular evidences of design suggested *ends* or purposes. But that modern science explained these examples as instances of the reign of law, exhibiting order or plan, in the evolutionary form. Hence the Argument from Order to a great Intelligence became prominent among Design-arguments. This was why he proposed to call it "eutaxiology," or "the sum of reasonings from the Order of Nature respecting the existence of God." He exalts "eutaxiology" rather extravagantly at the expense of design-arguments proper, but makes some interesting and acute observations,—among them that "there has been the ambiguous use of common words, such as design, and the distorted application of scholastic phrases, such as 'final cause' . . . . . The elements of eutaxiology have been more or less involved in the arguments of physico-theology from the earliest times to the latest. . . . . They made no analysis of the conceptions involved in teleology, no logical scrutiny of its validity, and its limitations." As regards the argument from Order, he says, "the eutaxiological inference would be strictly limited to Intelligence without volition," *i.e.*, it cannot prove benevolence or intention, but only a causing Intelligence.

114. I look at the Argument from Order somewhat differently from Hicks, but agree with him that in its strict form it is distinct from the one from Design. He did not, I consider, give sufficient attention to analyzing the latter, of which my view is as follows: "The socalled Argument from Order is the proposition that *the regular and symmetrical arrangements of things which abound*

everywhere must be the work of an Intelligence. But by Order we may mean either of two things: in the first place mere *regularity of parts,* which is an argument for an underlying Unity but not for an Intelligence; or secondly, a *symmetry,* or *relation of parts which pleases or tends to happiness,*—in a word, touches the chord of Joy. The latter is part of the Argument from Design" (which is an argument from Feeling and not from regularity. Order ought to be confined to regularity.)

115. On the other hand, my view of the Argument from Design—which I call the Teleology of Joy, and on which the theory of purpose in the Outer Consciousness is founded, is as follows: If we analyze the simplest type of an act of will, such as extending one's hand to get an apple,—dismissing all previous conceptions of willing, and regarding only the phenomena concerned in what occurs, it will be found to consist essentially of:

the coördination of

A certain series of mechanical movements

With

A certain series of states of consciousness,

Towards a result, a concomitant of which is a pleasure (or away from a result a concomitant of which is a pain).

Complex acts of willing sometimes appear to consist of different elements from these; but such appearances have only to be analyzed to their ultimate constituents to be reduced to the same formula. The impression that other factors than pleasure or pain are desired and felt in willing are based upon reasons similar to those in the ethical arguments for "goods," other than joys, and "evils" other than "pains." Where not solvable by the analyses of the Utilitarians, they are traceable (through habit, instinct and reflex action) to the sphere of the Outer Consciousness after the manner followed in the previous chapter on "The Outer Consciousness in Ethics."

116. The formula of willing above stated is important since it enables one to resolve several questions which are confusing if considered from complicated examples. From it, for instance, we can at once deduce the conclusion that *we have the power,* to follow joy, and thus are not helpless in the universe,—a doctrine which has immense and precious consequences.

But far more important than simplicity of formula are the results that follow the consideration of the nature of pleasure (or, as it should be termed, joy, and in its higher manifestations, happiness). Once we realize what joy and pain actually are as we feel them and once we have grasped the principle that all things known to us are indifferent except in so far as they result in joy or pain to someone, we recognize that whatever persistently pursues objects of joy presumably understands that joy, and its act is an act of conscious knowledge; and when it persistently brings to us objects of joy it must have a knowledge of that joy and presumably a will to bring it. If it appears to do so unconsciously, then it is proper to look about for some other purposer as a source of the persistent gift. *Joy is so significant that it cannot be overlooked as can the vast stream of indifferent facts* which to us compose the phenomena of the universe in general. *The latter are incapable of proving purpose of any kind, except by superficial analogies.* Joy is the sole fundamental basis of the concept of value. In paragraph 82, I mentioned the confessed inability of some of the most accomplished psychologists to arrive at an analysis of Values on the basis of introspection of the individual consciousness. But on the superpersonal theory the difficulty disappears. Primitive Christian psychology (which is superpersonal) had already solved it.

The words of Lotze given at the end of the last chapter emphasize the significance of joy. Alexander Bain also wonderfully describes it in his passage about the delight of the sweetbriar odor. Hymnology is full of it.

117. In one sense there may be said to be a tropism towards joy. But it is the fundamental purpose-tropism, unlike any other in being that which interprets all the other tropisms. Loeb thought that by artificially imitating all the others he had settled all tropisms as physical and banished mind as a directive. His successes in producing artificial reproduction and tropisms towards light, chemicals, and so forth were no answer to the psychic "tropism" towards joy. When defeated in one form it seeks and finds another. And in palæontologic life, in the words of a master of that science, Henri Ami, "it is forever going one better."

When therefore we find the persistent results of the operations of the Outer Consciousness to be to bring us joy and enable us to evade pain, the natural conclusion is

the presence in it of conscious intelligence. This is the principle of the Teleology of Joy. It throws a light on the operations of the Outer Consciousness and opens up a new world to discovery. I propose to briefly sketch the difference between this teleology and those to which men have applied that term, as well as to recapitulate the conclusions to be derived.

118. A distinction between the true Argument from Design and the true Argument from Order has been drawn above, and some defects in the latter indicated which reduce its value to secondary and derivative; that from Design being based on conclusions from joy-and-pain, while that from Order rests on regularity and therefore upon *indifferent* facts. This conclusion is confirmed by a study of these arguments and the discussion thereon presented in Hicks, Janet, and similar compendiums. There is nothing in the Argument from Order that the mechanist doctrine of an immanent unconscious order in the universe does not plausibly explain. In that from Design, however, there is strength, not in bare appearances of ends, but in so far as the examples imply some phase of the Teleology of Joy. "Benevolence", "goodness", "utility", "kindness", "benefit", "beauty", "admirable provision for the whole animal world" were some of the phrases of old teleologists that betrayed their foundation. John Ray in "The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation", 1691, wrote: "The great wisdom of the Divine Creator appears in that there is *pleasure* annexed to those actions that are necessary for the support and preservation of the *individuum*, and the continuation and propagation of the species; and not only so but *pain* to the neglect or forbearance of them."

119. Hicks was very partial to his Argument from Order. He says (p. 355): "The mind-marks stamped upon any geometrical figure are deeper and more ineffaceable than the merely human marks. If we found such figures in places inaccessible to men, we should have no doubt of intelligence having been concerned in their production." Is not this bad logic? Crystals do not prove intelligence. Neither does regularity in constellations. Hicks admits other limitations: "The utmost" he concludes, "that can be claimed from this argument alone is that intelligence exists in the universe. A personal Supreme Being is not proved; volition is not proved; benevolence is not proved; even intelligence is not proved

to be infinite." (p. 368. This too is one of the chief defects in the interesting system of Driesch, whose principle of "wholeness" (ganzheit) is based upon Order.

120. Today it is possible to construct a new teleology on the basis of evolution. Ample material is to be found in the innumerable contrivances for joy and success which are such outstanding marks of the great process. But this mass of marks of intelligence should be interpreted *as one movement*—not a congeries of individual disjecta membra. There is an intimate connection between joy-and-pain and evolution, consequently close study should be given to these facts and all possible use made of them.

121. Recognizing the overwhelming evidence for evolution, noting its identity of type with human willing, and applying the test of persistent joy-production and pain-evasion to the consideration of functions and instincts, the unity of this joy-producing movement everywhere will be noted, and in it a conscious personality seen at work.

122. Once the Teleology of Joy is thus applied and its cumulative strength perceived, the Argument from Order becomes a powerful branch and auxiliary of it,—not because of order in itself, which remains an indifferent fact, but by contributing the joys of unity, vastness, stability, and ease of comprehension which the fact of vast order can bring to a world of joy,—a world of design.

123. Other historic arguments fall into place in the system. The misnamed Argument from Final Causes—the other remnant of the older Argument from Design—being the doctrine that converging lines of construction toward "ends" prove purpose—proves nothing except in so far as it coincides with the teleology of joy. We have remarked how the regularities of crystals prove nothing at first hand, and how the theory of an immanent order (which is a mechanist theory) is a sufficient reason for such appearances. The phrase "final causes" also has nothing to do with the law of cause and effect, but is a verbal notion of the schoolmen. Nevertheless, although muddled in logic and phraseology, this ancient argument has rendered good service in the past as a football for debate and for the trying out of distinctions, and has nursed its twin offspring, the Teleology of Joy and the Argument for Order. It is not hard to study these considerations

if one reads with an independent mind such a repertory of the theories as Paul Janet's "Les Causes Finales" and the more so because Janet was substantially pre-evolutionary.

124. If confusion has sometimes resulted from the fact that in man himself, his ends sometimes have the appearance of being devoid of any motive of joy or pain, or may even occasionally court pain rather than joy, it is because the true end does not lie on the surface of the individual consciousness but in the hyperpsych behind it.

125. Paley's much-borrowed analogy between the found watch and the ordered constellations and anatomy of man, falls into the same category. The watch is an object of a class which our experience tells us is frequently manufactured by men. Our experience cannot say this either of the constellations or of the anatomy of man. *As a mechanism*, natural selection quite explains the latter, and the related doctrine of immanent order the former. There is no reason why an accidental universe should not be accidentally of an orderly form. There is so far no compelling reason for assuming intelligence. There is no teleology in mechanical phenomena except where close association with conscious phenomena afford some derivative force of inference.

126. Darwinian selection does not explain Happiness: but is essentially indifferent,—a form of mechanism. Nor even the subjective selection of James Ward—except in so far as it might involve happiness. The present theory of Affective Selection aims to fill the gap.

For in the sphere of animal consciousness the logic is different. When all the guards and contrivances for the protection and benefit of the infant, and all those for the benefit of man and the animals are contemplated, a totally distinct class of examples are recognized. The objects are sentient. They have feelings. Paley's Argument has that much of solid residuum.

127. The Argument from Conscience and a Moral Order in the Universe likewise has its true basis in the Teleology of Joy, as was explained in "The Outer Consciousness in Ethics."

Of the other historic Arguments which theists have enshrined in "natural theology" the Ontological, and Causal, are not of teleological nature, and the Anthropo-

morphic is founded on an assumed likeness of God to Man. It also has a sound residuum, if not pushed too far, for it is by man's psychology alone that we can find materials for psychology in Nature. The Outer Consciousness is the link.

128. The results which might be achieved by the Teleology of Joy have been partially indicated. In the chapter on "The Outer Consciousness; a Biological Entity," was sketched the application of the principle to the outcomes of functional, instinctive, and evolutionary operations, carrying the happiness-interpretation of Bentham and Mill, concerning objects of desire into the realm of the subconscious, and of the so-called Unconscious, throughout the realm of living beings. In "The Person of the Outer Consciousness" it was aimed to show that the proposed Teleology dissolved the claims of the mechanist philosophies; and the light it might throw on future happiness, individual personality, and immortality, was suggested. In "The Cosmic Aspect" the same principle was advanced as of probable use in tracing the scope of the Soul throughout the universe at large. In "The Outer Consciousness in Ethics," it was applied to the clarification of moral ideal and intuition, and to reconciliation of the great schools of ethics.

It may here be added that the great successes of Behaviorism—and as a one-sided system it has shown itself of immense scientific value in the hands of men like Loeb, T. H. Morgan, Watson and Bernard,—are founded on the inherent uselessness of indifferent (non-affective) facts to prove purpose or directiveness. John B. Watson has said: "We need nothing to explain behavior but the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry" . . . . . and "Order in the universe is merely a matter of conditioning." But the defect of Behaviorism is that it overlooks the inherent significance of affective facts.

129. If purpose be invariably attended by joy-aims, then it is legitimate to look for purpose wherever there is persistent beauty or other joybringing thing, wherever there is *any* joy or joy-bringing thing at all, wherever there is instinct or aspiration. And joy may prove to be an undreamt of interpreter of the universe. For with the hyperpsych in mind, the lovely beauty of the woods, the stars, the innumerable snow crystals, the coral marvels of the oceans, the shell iridescences, the uninhabited places, the cloud-realms, the infinite universe of infinite

loveliness,—all are for our deeper Self. The marvellous eye and ear are only rudimentary stages towards one completer Sense. Human delight touches only a drop of the Ocean of Joy. Is it too bold a hope that this theory of an Outer center of consciousness may offer a field of detail and discovery in evolutionary psychology not unworthy of a humble place beside the other fields now so well explored. Has the vast element of Feeling ever been given its chance in science? Or has it been abandoned to Mysticism?

NOTE.

130. In order to better fix the place of the Teleology of Joy, I append in condensed form, the following résumés of two sides of the matter, by two competent authorities, who seem to me to give fair accounts of the recent position of teleological theories as seen from their opposite points of view.

I.

The Rev. James Lindsay, LL.D., in "Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion," 1897, (pp. 170-215) says: "It appears to us a decided theistic advance that the Eutaxiological argument, drawn from the order and harmony of nature, as betokening plan and speaking intelligence, has its relations and serviceableness as a preliminary to the teleological proof, more exactly defined and more fully described. In a vastly higher way it has been seen by the Eutaxiologist how, in the words of Dante:

"Among themselves all things
'Have order; and from hence the form, which makes
"The universe resemble God."

These twin arguments have better recognized each other as theistic allies, and have dwelt in larger unity. . . . . We agree with those who perfectly recognize the entirely changed aspect of the Paleyan argument from adaptations when these adaptations are viewed in the light of their being issues of a process of evolution in time. . . . . We must believe it the need of the philosophy of theism today to dismiss the idea of design to begin with, and to lead up whither the teachings of evolution may direct. . . . . We certainly insist on all rational caution in divining of final causes or intrinsic ends. . . . . but not practical abandonment of all belief in ends that have been devised by intelligence. . . . . True, such ends cast little or no light on the nature of conceiving or devising intelligence,—say as to the unity or the immanence of said intelligence. . . . . .

There is good reason to lament that more has not been done to enable design to reassert itself amid all evolutions of time. Only those who have followed the course of recent theistic endeavor know how much loose thinking has had to be cut away from scientific sophistry as to final causes. . . . . It has recently been the aim of theistic thought to concentrate its attention mainly on the field of organic nature as being that wherein adaptation to internal ends or evidences of will-purposes are most palpable. . . . . And it concludes only to a *finite* cause adequate to the phenomenal world, for that is all that can here be legitimately inferred. . . . . Recent theistic philosophy has purified itself of any former philosophic indiscretions in the sphere of teleological inquiry. . . . . It perfectly recognizes the fact that the material with which he works must have a limiting effect for the Designer. . . . . Inthe spirit of the *Ethics* of Aristotle, it sees purpose combining with all action, sees some end or good for every movement. . . . . The immanent thinkers like Trendelenberg have held a philosophy of design to the effect that wherever design is found realized in the world it was preceded by thought as its First Cause. . . . . But of course we must see that there *is* design, and not the fact of actual fitness or adaptation merely. . . . . It may be perfectly true that we are called to reason from the present life and no other; but under what compulsion must our view of the present life be confined to what is merely external? . . . . . There must be no blinking of the sad facts of plague and tempest, of dearth and disaster, of disease and death. . . . . But it has more carefully distinguished the suffering animal world from the world of suffering man, recognizing in how many ways the former is exempt from troubles that belong to man as a being gifted with rational foresight and beset with so many hopes and fears. . . . . Thought has enriched the world with a wider and worthier teleological view of the world as an organism having an end in itself than was possible to the older theory of it as a machine of so many parts indwelt by no principle of life. . . . . and has shown a decided inclination to at least entirely discard the phrase 'final cause,' since end is not properly cause at all. . . . . It has preferred to view end or purpose in an inductive light rather than an a priori aspect. . . . . Still, we must reject an unconscious finality as foreign to all our experience. . . . . Professor Romanes thinks the inference of our knowledge as a whole to be towards establishing the fact that design—if operative in nature,—makes for

animal improvement or evolution, rather than for animal enjoyment or well-being. . . . . There is no such thing as an unconscious teleology. . . . . What we have been showing has just been the utter impossibility or futility of trying to escape a true and real teleology in Nature, as it appears to any scientific or organically evolutional view of the universe. . . . . but it must be said that the ripest results of that argument are yet to be found."

II.

131. An opposite view is contained in the article "Zoology" by Sir Edwin Ray Lancaster in the Encyclopædia Britannica, 1911: "Darwin's theory had as one of its results the reformation and rehabilitation of teleology. . . . The so-called evidences of design which was supposed to modify the limitations of types assigned to Himself by the Creator were seen to be adaptations due to the selection and intensification by selective breeding of fortuitous congenital variations which did not survive in the struggle for existence. Thus not only did Darwin's theory give a new basis to the study of organic structure but . . . . . finally, it brought the simplest living matter or formless protoplasm before the mental vision as the starting point whence, by the operation of necessary mechanical causes, the highest forms have been evolved, and it rendered unavoidable the conclusion that this earliest living material was itself evolved by gradual processes, the result also of the known and recognized laws of physics and chemistry from material which we should call 'not living.' It abolished the conception of life as an entity above and beyond the common properties of matter and led to the conviction that the marvellous and exceptional qualities of that which we call 'living' matter are nothing more or less than an exceptionally complicated development of those chemical and physical properties which we recognize in a gradually ascending scale of evolution in the carbon compounds, containing nitrogen as well as oxygen, sulphur and hydrogen as constituent atoms of their enormous molecules. Thus mysticism was finally banished from the domain of biology, and zoology became one of the physical sciences."

A revulsion from the evolutionary mechanist position of the last writer is well under way. But by comparing Lankester's point of view with Lindsay's, one obtains a conspectus of the conflict which still constitutes the teleological situation, and it may facilitate an understanding of the place which the theory of the Outer Consciousness seeks to fill.

CHAPTER VI.

The Outer Consciousness and a Future Life.

133.—Our centre of consciousness is in the hyperpsych.—136. Instinct of future life.—137. Four forms.—140. Man is like a leaf.

132. Whoever aims to present a new thought concerning conscious survival after death starts against heavy odds. James, in his Ingersoll Lecture on "Immortality" remarks that "at the back of Alger's 'Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life,' there is a biblography of more than five thousand volumes." Any large library has a formidable collection. Not only has the question been a first interest of all mankind for untold centuries, but everybody knows that it has brought out many of the profoundest reflections of the best philosophers, poets and theologians.

Still, the hope remains that, founded on the evolutionary facts collected in a new age, which have affected the forms of so many other ideas, a new aspect drawn from them may prove unhackneyed.

133. In nothing does the placing of the centre of our consciousness outside the individual man, by the method indicated in the previous chapters of this series, seem more fruitful in possible practical consequences than in respect to the question of conscious survival. In effect, it implies an offered solution; for if our larger life is already beyond the body, the dissolution of the body does not mean our extinction. This point of view evidently differs from all theories which are centred in the individual man. Just as in Ethics and Teleology, whoever seeks the solution in surface phenomena of the individual consciousness must meet formidable uncertainties. And if, on another hand, it be sought in the physical phenomena of the body, these are all, or nearly all, against survival. But if the death of the body is like the fall of a leaf, and our centre of life is in the Tree, the conclusion is at once different. No bodily,—in fact, no material,—changes af-

fect the persistence of the deeper consciousness. The fall of a star is in this respect the same as the fall of a leaf.

134. The next differentiation of our theory is from all those noble and ancient religious conceptions which regard man's soul as an emanation from some form of the divine; not because their principle may not be substantially correct, but because they do not rest on inductive reasoning, as this theory aims to do. Nor is it very necessary to add that, for the same cause, it is to be distinguished from all the modern deductive metaphysical hypotheses, and the great mystical systems which attribute to man various relations to a Universal or Central Unity.

135. What we seek is to explore the capabilities of inductive scientific argument. Ours is one of the attempts to unravel the story of evolution. And with special emphasis on the elements of its psychological side. By applying the Teleology of Joy,—which is only a clarification of the Argument from Design—we arrive at conclusions which are a beginning of insight into that Outer Life of which we form parts, and that Outer Person, with whom we are one, and with whose consciousness ours displays its unity to a constantly varying coalescence. Some of the characteristics of that Life—the life of the Person of Evolution—(for it is more than a process, an entelechy or a Power)—have been suggested in the preceding pages. In brief, they are: its action as a vast composite living being, of which all lesser individuals are really and truly extensions; the antiquity of its life-history; its continuous partial appearances as instincts and intuitions; its purposive reasoning; its ingenious intelligence; its care for vast and unknown numbers; its independence of human intelligence and will; its universality of outlook; its appreciation of Joy; its progress towards universal happiness. Many other characterizations are probably within our power of knowledge; although we must recognize that human knowledge has great and certain limitations.

136. If we examine the connection between the Outer and Inner Consciousness, we will notice that when an instinct, such as the maternal, wells up in a human inner consciousness, it blends with the conscious reasoning of the moment, and the two correct one another for the best welfare of—in the example of maternity—the infant. Since this is a typical example, it proves the continuity of our conscious purposing with that of the Outer Consciousness

and the unity and similarity of their willing and purposing. If we turn from the standpoint of similarity and close association to that of origin, we are borne to the same conclusion. Our embryology and descent refer us unmistakably to the same unity of consciousness with the rest of the evolutionary family or Person. If again, we scrutinize the problems of the moral consciousness which have been touched upon in "The Outer Consciousness and Ethics", we are once more led back to that unity.

137. We now turn to the instincts—part of our mental and, as we hold, conscious heredity. For us the instincts are not subjects that go beyond our programme of inductive logic. They are part of the special material of our theory and therefore not alien to its rules. Instinct (in that broadest meaning, which includes also the functions and all their related phenomena) wells into the human consciousness in four forms:

(1.) That of infancy—the period of unreflecting trust in the operations of the Outer Consciousness,—a miniature indication of the nature of that other life.

(2.) That of "happy-dying"—a form of repetition of, and return to, the instinctive trustfulness of infancy—and, like it, an indication of the nature of the other life.

(3.) That of the unsophisticated—including all unlettered peoples and classes. Here, though mixed with more or less misinformation and illogical errors, its essence can be distinguished in religious faith and aspiration.

(4.) That of the sophisticated: where the glare of consciousness of the mundane world obscures instinct and emphasizes the superficial phenomena of that world. Yet to perform this emphasis is the first purpose of the human individual considered as an organ—a local focus of the Outer Consciousness. In fact this emphasis is a necessary process of evolutionary adjustment to a particular environment. Thus this local world of ours, though small, is rich in sharp distinctions and clear perceptions so far as it goes. It is the task of our science to apply these to all existing phenomena and thus in the end to enlarge the work of consciousness. With regard to the question of conscious survival, it must consider instincts one by one and in their characteristics on the plane of individual consciousness; and also, and more especially, in their general movement and meaning in the mass, as part of the one great movement of evolution.

138. With respect to the first form in which instinct

wells into consciousness, none can improve on Wordsworth's "Ode on Intimations of Immortality in Early Childhood." The second is amply proved by the testimony of many physicians and soldiers familiar with the last moments of the dying. The third is the subject of innumerable religious books. In Hebrew-Christian literature it is expressed by

"I know that my Redeemer liveth."
"The Lord is my Shepherd."
"As the hart panteth after the water brooks."

The fourth form has simply to systematize the other three.

Each of the forms is a phase of the evidence. Complete study of them all is desirable.

139. Nothing is to be gained here by entering into attempted descriptions of the nature of the other life. Enough that, according to the indications of our subject, it is conscious, personal, benevolent, continuous, brilliant, happy, progressive, immortal for at least all purposes we can regard as practical, infinite in the same sense, and as infinitely profound and multifarious. If we aspire to detail knowledge beyond the scope, of our limitations, we ought not to expect it, but since we do not know our real limitations, there is no reproach in continually attempting to scale them.

140. Although our world of phenomena is the world of detail for us, may it not enable us to attain indirectly some valuable grasp of even a part of the detail of the world of our Outer Consciousness? Our world is part of the other. In addition to being able to put ourselves in the places of many other forms of living beings of our protoplasmic cousinhood, may we not reap something from studies of colonialities in general. As individual organs of the great evolutionary protoplasmic being, is each of us not a colony of it, and not merely a colony separated but a colony unseparated and still a living part of the original? Is not all organship simply a form of coloniality? And are the laws of coloniality not also laws of purposing? Has coloniality in all its aspects ever been seriously studied? Thus a new psychology—that of the hyperpsychic mind, would seem to present itself.

Yet for the present paper these vistas of enquiry, are but variations on the main matter concerning the other life—the maxim, that whether the Tree be of one foliage or another—whether its flowers bloom in one or another concord of shimmering loveliness—OUR LIFE IS IN THE TREE.

CHAPTER VII.

Schopenhauer and the Outer Consciousness.

141.—Resemblances of his "Will" to the Outer Consciousness.—142. Differences.—143. Deductive, not inductive.—144.. Blind, not conscious.—146.. Pessimistic.—148. Impersonal.

141 (1.) The Outer Consciousness theory can be partially elucidated by comparing it with one to which it has several points of resemblance.

When, in 1819, the brilliant son of Dantzig, issued "The World as Will and Idea"—*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*,—he was dealing with the same subject. His approach, his solutions, his treatment, were very different. But had he lived fifty years later—fifty years further from the strong influence of his master Kant, and in the full stream of evolutionary thought—there are indications that he would have tended naturally to an inductive system, and rebelled against introspective interpretations of the universe—in other words, would, like Darwin, have formed his conclusions on broad bases of facts, rather than, like Kant, have elaborated them in his study. For he eagerly sought support for his principles in the natural sciences. While Kant propounded, rather obscurely, that the universe is a projection of the Subject (but with reserve of some outer reality), and Fichte, that it is a projection of the Subject alone, and subsequently Schelling that it is a projection of the Object alone, Schopenhauer insisted that it was none of these, but the representation which contains them both: that both matter and intelligence are aspects of the same fundamental thing, and that that fundamental thing is the Will; that within us it wells up as the *human will:* that in the exterior universe it appears as *force;* that it is the one source of all things, and is in fact the unknowable Thing-in-itself; and that even intelligence is but its product and servant.

(2.) According to him, this fundamental source of all things appears in the inorganic world as *cause;* in the plant world as *excitation;* in the animal world as *motive*

(including desire, joy, anger, hate, fear, etc.) It is itself blind, but seeking happiness, it forms the world ,and ultimately the brain, which produces intelligence (as a mere function) in order to attain the objects desired by the universal Will. Intelligence is consequently its interim instrument, and does not deserve to be exalted to the first place, as it usually is. That of which each of us has immediate knowledge is our will. The voluntary act and the action of the body are not two things but one and the same. The foundation of our being is our will; its immediate manifestation is our body. The will is identical with all the forces which act throughout Nature.

(3.) It is evident that Schopenhauer's start is made, not from a basis of collected facts, but from a general idea derived from Kantian idealism. He partly also drew it from Berkeley, the subjective idealist par excellence, of whom he was a pronounced admirer. Nevertheless, as Ribot says, "he holds empty and vague terms in horror, such as absolute, infinite, suprasensible and others of the same kind; he applies to them the remark of the Emperor Justinian, "They are nothing but negative terms, accompanied by an obscure conception'." This is rather extreme condemnation for worthy idealist speculations which after all have great uses. He makes attempts to escape the effect of the first origin of his system by appealing to the natural sciences for empirical support but he does not effectively get away from his preconceptions. He glibly speaks of the *irresistible tendency* of waters to cavities; the *perseverance* of the compass towards the north, the *ardent desire* of iron towards the compass, the tug of gravitation,—all these are to him one and the same thing with human purpose. Of this unity he produces no proofs: in his hands it remains an assertion.

(4.) In the vegetable world, the objectivation of the Will, becomes more intelligent, but the Will remains unconscious, as in the organic world. Each vegetable has its determined character, *i.e.,* it wills in a special manner, —one prefers a humid environment, one a dry, one turns to light, another to water. The animal kingdom is a higher manifestation. It requires for its complex life the aid of intelligence. By this the Will passes up from darkness to light. The animal body, being the objectivation of the Will, its members represent the essential desires of the Will, the teeth, the pharynx, the intestinal canal, are

hunger objectivated, the brain is the expression of the will to know, the foot to go, the stomach to digest.

(5.) Ultimately the Will produces man. "A being superior to him and more intelligent would be impossible; for he would find life too deplorable to tolerate for an instant" (Ribot): Here appears Schopenhauer's pessimistic interpretation of the universe. The constant effort of the Will is to live and attain happiness, but it finds life painful and disappointing. Hence, to escape it and return to oblivion is the true aim, as taught in the Vedanta and Buddhist philosophies.

(6.) The Will is indestructible, as being the thing-in-itself: only appearances are destructible. All death is an appearance, all destruction an illusion. The Will, perpetually continues its blind effort to live. The individual dies, the species is indestructible. He uses the simile of the leaf and the tree: "Know then thine own being in that interior force of the tree, hidden but always acting, which through all its generations of leaves, knows neither birth nor death. Is not man as a leaf?"

142. Comparing Schopenhauer's theory, point by point with that of the Outer Consciousness: There is first, the general resemblance in the fact that both are theories of willing. Without any connection of origin, both analyze the human will as a mysterious something uniting in parallel action certain material phenomena with certain phenomena of consciousness. Both find in it a far wider thing than the human will,—a constructive power working through the world—in fact the constructive power of the universe. But Schopenhauer, imbued with German speculative universalism, prefers to look at it as the unknowable Thing-in-itself, while the Outer Consciousness theory is occupied with the lesser and more practical demand for a preliminary complete descriptive and analytical study of its characteristics as they are. It starts with the concrete facts of willing; follows their connections into the concrete spheres of habits, instincts, reflexes, functions, behaviors, reactions, looking to the students of these things for guidance, and thence into the connected worlds of teleology and evolution,—and asks that they all be interpreted together. Thereby it hopes for real and new knowledge.

143. Schopenhauer recognizes evolution—but in the nebulous form invented by Kant and improved by Laplace

half a century later—a speculation in a period of speculations. It was wanting in the sound and directive foundation of systematized observations given it by Darwin and the hosts of modern scientists. For Schopenhauer, species are immutably fixed. He scarcely dreamt of beginning with detail. Yet he has a theory of crystallization, of vegetable life, of the production of animal organs, and finally as we have seen of human intelligence. These theories are all rudimentary and far removed from the science of to-day. His chief merit, to my mind, is that he recognizes the oneness of Evolution with willing. Moreover, he sees in it a united forward movement of the Will. And he recognizes it as a progressive process of invention. But to what definite end? Merely to awake into life, and to realize a yearning for happiness which is doomed to be met with defeat. There does not occur to him as any part of the picture, the vast conscious life of a higher biological being, colonially constituted, and thrusting out its organs in all directions, and in whose psychology lies the foundation of the psychology of all its organs.

144. Schopenhauer also perceives something of the nature and place of pleasure-pain in the universe. To him they are facts of Will, the objects of its desires, the most inner and essential facts we know. In this he acutely grasped a great psychological truth. Yet as they are facts of consciousness, why does he represent his universal Will as unconscious? The Outer Consciousness theory considers it as very highly conscious and as constantly seeking to express and satisfy its affective consciousness in the individual with a definite programme of pursuit of true joy and escape from pain.

145. Schopenhauer has no use for any teleology except the gropings of his Will. Yet there is no will without teleology and no universe-Will without a universe-teleology. He misses the joy-values of present Nature and of evolutionary life and history, of purposes attained, of the æsthetic phases of existence, of multitudinous beauty, of the marvels of attainment, their indications of the widespread consciousness, their records of the past, their pictures of the future, and revelations of hidden worlds. To these the Outer Consciousness theory looks for rich fields of tangible psychological light. To it all beauty, all joy, are chapters in the history of Purpose, and of a Person.

146. Most of all, Schopenhauer seems to have failed in his pessimistic conclusions. If in anything he is more unscientific than another, it is in these. Hereditary depression and perhaps that personal perversity to which he appears to have been prone—both doubtless due to an extreme neurotic sensitiveness—led him insensibly to give a painful color to existence which is far from the careful reading. His pessimism was of the dilettante variety too: it was histrionic and temperamental: his own life held none of the sorrows of suffering men; he was comfortable, educated, flattered; he enjoyed the melancholic sentimentalism of his favorite Hindu philosophies. Not in such soil is found a true balance of the joys and sorrows of the universe. Care, completeness and accuracy must be employed in this study. The elemental power to follow joy and flee from pain, the acquisition of protective processes and organs, the enlistment of the higher intelligent devices, the selection and systematization of the "anæsthetics", the secrets of the built-up ethical and other wisdom of the past—these and their triumphs must be weighed against the failures, dreadful as some of them are. Above all, the momentous problem of joy and sorrow must be viewed from the outer standpoint of the universe—not from the little view of an individual life. In that large light, pessimism does not seem to be the answer.

147. What then is that which is indicated as the Actor of all willing? Is it the Will alone—the Will as Schopenhauer conceives it, helpless, groping, unconscious? Or is it what the human will is associated with,—not alone a willing, but feeling, conscious self? Is the Outer Will, like the inner, an aspect of a Person? Or does it change its fundamental character when it projects that branch stream of itself which is the individual? The theory of the Outer Consciousness does not so hold. It finds the key in æsthetic Feeling rather than in Force. And only in subsequent corollary does it venture to regard all Force as a partial phase of the conscious willing which the presence of feeling shows in region after region of Nature.

148. It is surprising to find so acute and in some respects so modern a mind as Schopenhauer placing man at the summit of the universe. And for such a diseased and pitiful—almost whimsical—reason as that a higher intelligence would find life too deplorable! The Outer Consciousness theory views man as a frequently repeated stage in a process of change, the outcome of which will be

the attainment of something better, and, what is more important, whose foundation is of inexpressible depth and destiny.

149. Schopenhauer's reasoning regarding the indestructibility of life is remarkable though scarcely satisfactory. That all death is an appearance, all destruction an illusion, looks good, until it is made evident that the individual is to totally disappear and only the type survive. One might ask, What of millions of types that are gone? But also to what end is the survival such as it is? It certainly does not mean conscious survival, according to him. His use of the simile of the leaf and the tree has consequently a different meaning from the use (not derived from him) made of the same simile in the Outer Consciousness theory, where the seat of life, while outside the human individual, is his fuller and greater life in all respects.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Psychology of the Outer Consciousness.

151.—Simile of a strange animal.—152. Principles.—153. Characters of the Person of Evolution. Superpersonal. Aesthetic. Discriminating. Thinking?—157. Selfhood. Space. Time. Categories. Willing.—159. Differences from Man.—160. Its conditions of study.—161. Its unity.—163. Coloniality.—165. Its extra-human fields of joy.—168. Superpersonal psychology compared with behavioristic.

150. An old friend, Shadworth Hodgson, in his address on "The Unseen World", declared that "I rejoice with trembling when I consider the magnitude and extreme difficulty of that part of the subject which is now to be treated, namely man's position with regard to the unseen world, including the nature and amount of his knowledge concerning it." His theme was not the same as mine, but his hesitation at a task for which he had so many qualifications comes to me forcibly as I approach that still more uncharted enterprise, the psychology of the Spirit of Evolution. The utmost possible is a trial sketch.

151. Let the enquiry begin with the simile of an unknown animal (to represent the Outer Consciousness,) which comes at night out of a boundless wood, and leaves tracks and traces in a settlement. I would even for a moment over-emphasize the analogy of a superanimal so as to draw more sharply the distinction between this question, which is a psycho-biological one of an empirical kind, from those deeper questions, theistic and metaphysical, which lie behind it. Even the words "eternal," "infinite," "absolute" and "universal" in the technical sense shall be avoided, as going beyond the evidence of this inductive argument.

152. We have before arrived at certain special principles of the enquiry which shall serve as guides for its continuance. They are:—

(1.) That the typical act of human willing consists essentially of the coördination of a certain series of

mechanical movements with a certain series of states of consciousness, towards a result a concomitant of which is a pleasure (or away from a result a concomitant of which is a pain).

(2.) That that act is the type, not only of all human acts of willing, but of all the purposed acts of all animal creatures; and of all their reflexes, habits, functions, instincts, behavior, intuitions, conduct, in short of all their movements, conscious, subconscious, and unconscious; also of the development of all vegetable organisms;—of, in fact, all living substance, and apparently of all action in the known universe.

(3.) That all is (as regards its prima facie apparent character) the purposive work of one vast conscious Actor, a biological entity, manifesting a colonially organized form of conscious life, and being the deviser of many ingenious devices.

(4.) That its aim is the establishment of the most perfectly attainable happiness (and freedom from pain).

Doubtless there is a conceivable possibility, of an extremely tenuous sort, that there might exist other purposive elements than joy and pain, but the consideration is not practical; joy and pain are a sufficient explanation of all the facts we know. They are the factual affective material we find in our world, and on them alone serious psychologies of action and conduct should be built.

(5.) That it attains much, but not all, of the desired end.

(6.) It suffers many apparent disasters and failures. (If we could grasp the whole process better we might think otherwise).

(7.) The process of Evolution is the general and all-inclusive form of action of that entity, and is one continued act of purposive willing, of which all other actions are but details.

(8.) That that entity, the Person of the Outer Consciousness, or hyperpsych, following always the urge towards happiness, is constantly striving, by the constructive power inherent in its willing, to build out, and perfect, organs of itself in all directions, and it is more or less successful in favorable environments. All the terrestrial protoplasmic creatures, both vegetable and animal, are such organs, thrust forward by it during its past terrestrial life or phase, of many millions of years.

(9.) That the evidences of its purposive action in nature—and the only true proofs of purposive action in general—are those arrangements and devices which persistently produce joy and avoid pain. These constitute the basis of the "Teleology of Joy." Those more orderly arrangements which are found throughout the universe, stalactites, salt mine caverns, crystals, solar systems (the subjects of the so-called "eutaxiological teleology") do not necessarily prove purpose when not associated with joy or pain ends. Consequently it is to the facts of æsthetic feeling that we have to look for primary light concerning the psychology of the hyperpsych.

153. What then do the "tracks and traces" of this biological entity show?

Firstly, the seat of the consciousness of pleasure and pain shown in the purposive actions of the outer universe as we have before noted—is outside any terrestrial individual: so that the central point of view of the hyperpsych must be sought from that angle. Unless it has several subsidiary foci, in which case its central point of view would reside in the mass.

154. Secondly. The consciousness so indicated is primarily a series of æsthetic feeling. The series resembles in some degree our broken phases of Feeling. It bears the features of the pleasure-indifference-pain scale. It bears the evidence of wider, more perfect spread, variety, age and acuteness. It is so essential a part of the hyperpsych's psychology that wherever we find joy persistently produced, there is part of the hyperpsych's action, and at the same time it is an evidence of joy in the hyperpsych's own psychology. If we can add together, and put into their connections all the joys discoverable, past and present, we can draw a faint and imperfect picture of this part of the hyperpsych's consciousness. Does it feel them as the many as well as the one?

E. B. Titchener remarked several years ago something to the effect that Feeling had not yet received sufficient attention at the hands of scholars. Nothing truer has been said of recent years.

155. Thirdly, the "tracks and traces" of the supposititious Superanimal exhibit the faculty called Discrimination, or intelligent consciousness. For with the æsthetic feeling, there go the marvellous purposive adaptations.

Consciousness in the one form proves consciousness in the other. There may be unconscious order, but there is no such thing as unconscious adaptation to feeling. Discrimination implies awareness, the general characteristic of consciousness.

It also implies something more than awareness,—what in man we would call thinking. But in the hyperpsych it cannot quite follow the same method as human thinking, depending on our form of neurone machinery. But has it a machinery? It certainly uses and has built for that purpose,—the human and other protoplastic neurone mechanism. Our neurone mechanism—the whole mechanism through which our thinking works—is devised to meet the needs caused by the smallness of the individual's sphere compared with that of the hyperpsychic Person. To that end the small nervous and psychic range is concentrated into the changing focuses we call Attention; and various forms of mnemonic and other storages of results are added. The hyperpsych's Attention is vastly wider and more inclusive. Space and time would not come to It in small and roving instalments. Its world would be wider and more complete, its past would stay longer, its future be seen more clear.

Thus we can probably cast some dim light on another aspect of the psychology of the hyperpsych if we can add together in their proper connections and attentively survey, all the existing intelligent adaptations in the universe. And how far do the mechanistic problems of our psychology apply?

156. Discriminatory consciousness being but another form of perceptual consciousness, I venture to offer here (with due deference to all the wonderful details and theories of experimental psychology and physiology), a suggested statement of the relation of the latter to æsthetic consciousness. This one is very like others that have been advanced, such as Herbert Spencer's "activity" formula of pleasure and pain. It is adjustable to forms of protein simpler than the cell.

Conceive an unwalled single cell of amœba type. An object from outside impinges against a point on its periphery. At the first moment of the impact its presence is merely perceived: since it is not yet apparent whether it is destructive to the organism or can be absorbed constructively by it,—physical alternatives associated respectively with pain or pleasure. It is therefore not yet

assigned to either the pain or the pleasure end of the joy-pain feeling-scale. The state of consciousness produced by it is therefore at the indifferent point between the two. *This indifferent form of consciousness is pure perceptual.*

157. In feeling and in intelligence then, the consciousness of the hyperpsych exhibits some family likenesses to, and differences from, the limited human constitution.

What are those likenesses, and what the differences?

(The simile of a "Superanimal" having now sufficiently served its purpose, the term may be dropped.)

Are there not present in the hyperpsych evidences of other essentials of the human consciousness,—*self-hood, time and space* (*or space-time*), and so forth? How can a terrestrial, or even a wider, biological entity be conceived as other than existing in time and space: and if conscious, conceiving itself as so existing? But does not Einstein recognize a "relativity of simultaneity"? May there not be another *relativity of time?* Consider some short-lived butterfly's view of time if it could have one? Let us say that it finds events which to us are quite momentary long and full of incident. What if the hyperpsych regards all geological time as we regard a moment? It is not likely that hyperpsych time is very like human time. Similarly with hyperpsych space. The part played by Attention in these is closely associated with their psychology.

How far the Kantian system of analysis might apply, and how far not, is another question. To apply the human categories is certainly difficult.

158. Then there is the power of willing itself,—the to us unknown source of the nexus between æsthetic feeling and action—between the world of æsthetic consciousness and that of physical phenomena, as man might say. How does the hyperpsych experience it? We cannot conceive much about the nature of that to us unknown power; we can only note it. But there should be some resemblance.

159. If such be some of the features in which the psychology of the hyperpsych seems to have family resemblances to that of man, we can also note some additional differences:

Firstly, in the hyperpsych's duration and extent.

Its past life would be obviously at least all palæologic, and perhaps all geological, time.

And in all probability an immeasurable previous past.

All the events of its past existence are evidently before its consciousness, for its devices are grounded upon its experiences. Unlike those of man, whose momentary consciousness is always limited by the capacity of his Attention.

Moreover its aims for the *future* are always before it. How much farther can it see forward than man? Are its experiences the measure? It adapts its conduct by trial and error, like us.

The vast field of its present operations, and all the feelings and natures of its prodigious numbers of organs, are also before it. The protozoic, the subhuman, and the human minds, are probably all alike present in its consciousness.

This broad and ancient outlook is the ground of its and our own consciousness of moral universality (as outlined in Chapter IV., "The Outer Consciousness and Ethics",) and of all instinctive knowledge.

160. Another point of comparison. A man's conscious intelligence is only a small part of the intelligent processes going on in him. This is evidence that the intelligence of the hyperpsych, which includes them all, is, as might be expected, immensely greater than the man's.

Does not the key of individuality lie in the nature of *Attention?* For if a man's individual consciousness is connected in faint (and even to him apparently unconscious) forms with that of the hyperpsych,—and with other consciousnesses, either through it or directly—then the individual personality is larger than it appears to him —*i.e.* larger than it appears at its individual centre of attention—and its very nature as a concept is conditioned and formed by Attention, the concentration of consciousness. In a babe, is not the formation of experience an operation of "selective attention"? And with the experience the notion of personality? The only device by which limited man is able to use his consciousness is to use small portions of it at a time by successive concentrations of his attention.

The same reasoning applies to the æsthetic feeling of the hyperpsych. We leave behind the realm of our little senses. Does one great inclusive Sense take their place

sentient simultaneously to every vibration of profoundest space, sympathetic to every emotion, sensitive to every beauty, experiencing the heights and depths of a scale of which we only know a broken section?

It is evident that if we are to attempt to understand the hyperpsych, we must coördinate the psychologies of all the protoplasmic individuals, kingdoms, orders and communities. To human, we must add social, and then comparative, and genetic, psychology, and the revised teleology, and then the independent position of the hyperpsych itself, and allow for its unknown powers. Some items of the material, however, lie ready for use. What we call dreams must also not be overlooked. For dreams are thoughts of the hyperpsych.

161. How far is the hyperpsych psychologically a unit? Is it rather a loose and disconnected combination? Or is it an entirely unfounded concept, whose elements are not connected in any way? The last is in effect the working hypothesis of the psychologies of to-day. Any general handbook will confirm it. Yet it is an unthinking assumption.

The real arguments against unity are those of the pessimists, and now chiefly resolve themselves into the conflicts which exist between species and individuals in their struggles for survival. All animals live by destruction of vegetable beings: much vegetable and protozoöic life is destructive to animals. Every species is in battle against others. Most individuals are in some mortal rivalry with neighbors: and the lives of the predatory species seem to us bloody scenes of horror. Since each of all these derives its impulses from the hyperpsych, what unity can there be in the latter?

Yet if they be all thus conceived to be derived from the hyperpsych, it has at least the unity of a source of origin. Their common descent proves and preserves a long unity in time; their continued relationship a wide unity in space. And the constitution of man's mind is proof that a good deal of the interior apparent conflict is compatible with psychological unity.

And on the other hand, are not the conflicts more apparent than actual? Some reasons have been cited in the previous papers. Are they not parts of a method which is unitary in reality? The problem of the proof resolves itself into a question of relative joy-pain. In "The Person of the Outer Consciousness" it has been suggested

that the pains supposed to be attached to these conflicts are more apparent than real. Alfred Russell Wallace (Darwinism pp 25, 26, 27.) says: "Now there is, I think, good reason to believe that all this is greatly exaggerated; that the supposed torments and miseries of animals have little real existence. . . . . We must remember that animals are entirely spared the pain we suffer in anticipation of death—a pain far greater in most cases than the reality. . . . . On the whole then, we conclude that the popular idea of the struggle for existence entailing misery and pain on the animal world is the very reverse of the truth. What it really brings about is the maximum of life and the enjoyment of life, with the minimum of suffering and pain."

May we add that conflicts are part of the "trial work" of the evolutionary process. And by the fundamental principle of revulsion from pains, they tend finally to their own correction and contribute to the advance. Everything is "in process."

162. One thing however must be admitted. The process is not an ideal one, judged by the standard of joy-pain. This admission must be allowed its modificatory weight as regards the unitary nature of the hyperpsychic psychology. It is a unit, but not a perfect one.

163. There is one way in which it has been acting as a unit: it has pursued throughout the ages a single progressive end. By this it has crept from improvement to improvement until in this visible world of ours it has manifested among other results, the highly organized constitution of man, the song skill of birds, the marvels of insect achievement, the many glories of flower life. Must we not conclude that the progress attained is an increase of the happiness of the hyperpsych as well as of its system of manifested individuals? And if the synthesis of its results be qualified by a certain element of apparent failure in parts, would not this in general indicate that the hyperpsych's "mental makeup" is colonial, having some, perhaps remote but typical, sort of similarity to man's in that respect?

164. Coloniality in fact seems to be the plan which best explains its actions. Innumerable individual personalities each living its own brief life, nevertheless—mostly unconsciously—contribute also to the dominating, persisting, life, and help to carry on the common action and the

larger consciousness. Coloniality, in fact, has evidently a a far broader place than man throughout the universe, psychologically as well as physically. And somewhat as each colonial cell in a man,—each of his multitudinous cells—responds to every single impact of a stimulus from the environment and contributes to the high and subtle complexities of his every thought and feeling, so apparently in greater degree, the vaster multitude of "cells" in the hyperpsych contribute to its unfathomable consciousness.

Its coloniality can scarcely be very nearly the same as man's. Some of the differences are obvious—its magnitude, power, grasp, antiquity, permanence. Man has a relatively insignificant number and type of sub-individuals. And has it not a knowledge and care respecting the included individuals which man scarcely begins to possess, and which those beneath him never can?

What is the scheme upon which its uses of Instinct and Intelligence are adjusted and correlated? How can we more than feebly sketch it?

165. Are there not also indications throughout our world, of other fields of hyperpsychic action concealed within its materials, which favor the thought that other lives than any of those known to us may be part of the hyperpsychic system? Some of these indications have been mentioned at the end of "The Teleology of the Outer Consciousness",—the beauty of the woods, the stars, the hiding wild flowers, the innumerable snow crystals, the ocean corals, the cloud-realms, the further universe. For whose eyes are these? Does not he who sees them see into the heart of the Outer Consciousness?

166. In a recent visit to a natural history museum, I was struck by other examples, including the following: the golden-pearly sheens and graceful forms of many shells of old geological periods, such as the *Placenticarus placenta,* embedded in quantities in the rocks of Western Canada; the *Ammonites,* large and small, very numerous, exhibiting similar pearly paitinas, as well as the elegant *Ammonite* volute patterns resembling the finest ancient Ionic marble capitals; the *Abilone* shells, so prized for ornament by Pacific Coast Indians, which have their best sheens deeply concealed by weathered incrustations; the endless delicate shapes and tints of the *pectens;* the snowy intricately woven tubes of the *Euplectella speciosa,* whose alabaster loveliness is hidden during its lifetime as the skeleton of that sponge, and whose marvellous process of

building up its silica spicules has recently been described in *Nature;* the generations of graceful ferns, cones, and palms preserved in the Coal Measures of the world; the sparkling crystals of calcite embedded in fossil shells, and the endless world of gems, precious and semi-precious both in hoards and throughout the substance of the rocks themselves.

167. Beside these were ranged other beauties meant for the delight of certain living creatures, but in whose production they have no part. There was the brilliant breast and neck of the peacock, its mass of varied indigoes and dark and light blues shading into greens and olives of all possible tones; there also the humming birds, the male Rubythroated, *Trochilus colubris,* the *Chrysolampis,* the *Cometes,*—all with that marvellous brilliance of breast patch as if to burn the entrancement of their color harmonies into souls akin to theirs; there were also the *cayenne Cotinga* with shining peacock blue body, dark blue wings and tail, dark maroon throat and golden eye with black pupil; the *Cotinga caerulea,* with indigo body, dark blue wings and tail, and darkest maroon throat and breast; and the Red-tailed Chatterer, as splendid in another range of color.

We have mentioned elsewhere those joy-facts of insect psychology deduced from the flowers which were constructed to appeal to their sense of sight. Whoever sees flowers sees far into the past. But insects have also other good æsthetic senses, such as for the flower scents and honies. And their eyes are often of unrivalled brilliancy, perhaps the most beautiful of all physical objects. These eyes and their splendid wings and sheaths must thrill them. Do we not even get some psychological light on another phase of the matter from our *emotions,*—such as rage, fear, and love, those vivid accompaniments of the beneficial explosions of vital energy coming from our Annulid ancestry, (which they still betray by their visceral associations), and where they were one of the earliest forms of Instinct.

The foregoing examples reveal something of the hyperpsychic consciousness behind them. The glory of the hyperpsychic world is great.

168. Let us now compare our trial sketch of the psychology of the hyperpsych with a standard handbook of human psychology, the excellent manual of Warren of

Princeton. All the better that his work is of behaviorist type, with which the present writer disagrees.

Of mental life, his definition is that it "comprises the events which occur in the active give-and-take relations between organisms and their environment." Of the cell, "all agree in at least two fundamental characters: (1) The cell is capable of maintaining itself by ingesting material from without and casting off its own waste products; (2) It is capable under certain conditions of subdividing and therefore reproducing new cells." In short, of *maintenance* and *reproduction*. He does not attempt to discuss any interest in these powers. Affective consciousness is ignored as if it did not exist.

To explain Conscious Purpose, he adopts the theory of *Psychological Mechanism*, namely, that "purposive behavior is fully determined by neural activity, and that all the transformations involved in the chain of events may be expressed in terms of physical and chemical processes." (The significance of the pleasure and pain reaction, which appears so strong to the Outer Consciousness theory, does not occur to him).

In describing the nature of "behavior," he admits that "responsive reactions tend in general to promote the life processes or prevent the destruction of the creature"; but he fails to note the happiness factor, or anything more than pure mechanism, in that tendency.

Like others, he divides human behavior into reflexes, instincts and intelligent behavior, being "a classification based upon the nature of the central adjustment." "Intelligent behavior *becomes differentiated* into two distinct types called habit and rational behavior. (The differentiation is regarded as an accidental process!)

Of instinct, he says, "Earlier writers treated it as a mysterious innate power possessed by subhuman animals, which enabled them to do the right thing in the right way, without consciousness or deliberation. To-day we know that instinctive activity *is the result of* integration and coordination of nerve impulses, and that the adjustment is *due to* inherited connections between sensory and motor neurons." (Of two narrow hypotheses, the "earlier writers" had the more complete).

Concerning the shading of instinct into intelligent action, he says: "Few pure instincts are found in the human adult, but a great number of *modified instincts*. It would not be proper to treat these as forms of intelligent

behavior, yet strictly speaking they are not true instincts." (Ought not the conclusion rather to be that instinct and intelligence are forms of the same thing and easily combine?)

Of subconsciousness he remarks: "It may be assumed that the striking clock" (whose strokes of the hour he did not hear) "is actually heard, though not in relation to our dominant conscious life, and that the nerve impulses concerned in our fixed habits constitute 'conscious experiences' of subordinate centres, even though they fail to connect with our higher mental organization." (This sounds like the colonial theory.)

"The real significance of feeling in our mental life," he states, "can only be understood through a study of its biological history. . . . . The mechanism of the two opposite types of response" (*i.e.* avoiding noxious stimuli and reacting positively to beneficial) "*is developed through one of the phases of feeling.*" (Does this not imply the governance of the operation by feeling?)

The ingenious mechanist descriptions of Conations, Volitions, and Rational Thought, (as well as those above, of instincts, intelligence, æsthetic expression, and subconscious action) all suggest restatements in hyperpsychic terms. Similar difficulties are evident in the recent work on "Instinct" by L. L. Bernard, in which the existing confusions and disagreements are strikingly shown by careful quotations and tabulations. Professor Bernard is himself a behaviorist, who favors environment and habit to explain most of what others refer to instinct and heredity. He enumerates hundreds of alleged instincts cited by authors, and quotes many contradictory definitions, classifications and comminglings of psychological, biological, and other elements in the various theories. John B. Watson frankly envisages psychology as entirely based on chemistry and physics, in which consciousness plays no part and is merely a looker-on. The comprehensive superpersonal view would at once dispose of most of the confusion.

169. But non-mechanistic manuals also treat the subject in a disconnected way. Even Spencer's synthetic system, though based on a unitary view of evolutionary phenomena, offers behind them an indifferent abstraction.

170. In Outer Consciousness psychology, these would all be manifestations of the inclusive Person,—surface expressions of its mind. The instincts would indicate a

slow, but continuous and widespread unveiling of a purposive, benevolent, consciousness. Intellect would put together its unity, greatness and profounder aspects. The picture is gigantic. What Niagaras of willing, what judgment halls of awareness, what innumerable scouts at all the outposts, what unfathomable and growing joy attained, what murky chaos of pain disappearing in defeat. There a shoreless Stream of Experience flows by; Time, the current of that inner River, is there, but is swifter, and flows back as well as onward, so that history gives up its lives and scenes in unimaginable profusion; Space is not petty and limited to a few senses,—it opens in unthought dimensions; Speech and other symbols have no place in presence of the Things; Attention is not a focus but a Realm, and all the subordinate attentions form one communal whole; Fear, Hate, Hunger, Anger,—all the appetencies and animal emotions—are absent. And the terrestrial hyperpsych thrills constant messages to its neighbors across the Ether, subpersons in a greater Person. These characterizations are little more than negatives, for the positives cannot possibly be expressed by man. Yet, within our limits, it is in our constitution,—derived from the patient inventiveness of our Ancestor—to forever strive to open up further methods and materials of study of that Ancestor, the Person of Evolution. The stupendous in the psychological world ought no more to daunt us than the stupendous in the astronomical.

CHAPTER IX.

Is Superpersonality the Looked-for Principle?

171.—Brotherston's "Society an original fact.—173. Butler's "vaster being".—174. Galton's "cosmic mind".—175. Marshall's "higher consciousness.—178. Bergson's "vague and formless Being".—179. Vitalisms.—180. The Psychoanalyst "Censor".—181. J. S. Haldane's "new psychology".—184. Plea for Superpersonalism.

171. Many are to-day expecting some kind of a fundamental revolution in psychology. Is not the solution to be found in the direction of an organic *Superpersonality?*

In the *International Journal of Ethics of* October 1924 there appeared an article entitled "Society an Original Fact," by Professor Bruce Brotherston. The view he sets forth is that the "social organism" is "an original fact, that human nature is the nature of human society . . . that humanity first made its appearance as a social group . . . that in the truly primitive stage no individual was conscious of himself as an individual," that instead "there is always present in primitive men a *superindividual force*, . . . that in this complete fulfilment of the normal social conscience the individual has found himself a part of an empirical reality reaching out beyond himself and including the human race; the limits of his own personality and of his own period of life are transcended. . . transcending the individual with age-long and world-wide causes." And that the workings of this social whole are not reasonably explainable as merely a construct of its parts.

172. This is one man's form of a conclusion to which an increasing number of thinkers to-day are insensibly tending from various starting points, and which explains so many psychological and biological puzzles that it may well be, as I believe it is, the next new potent seed-germ in the movement of scientific thought.

173. We have seen that Samuel Butler, in *Life and Habit* (1883), wrote:

*Reprinted from the Philosophical Review. Vol. XXXV.

"Is it possible then to avoid imagining that if we have within us so many tributary souls, so utterly different from the soul which they unite to form, that they neither can perceive us, nor we them, though it is in us that they live and move. and have their being, and though we are what we are, solely as the result of their cooperation,—is it possible to avoid imagining that we may be ourselves atoms undesignedly combining to form some vaster being, though we are utterly incapable of perceiving that any such being exists, or of realizing the scheme or scope of our own combination? And this too not a spiritual being, which without matter, or what we think matter of some sort, is as complete nonsense to us as though men bade us love and lean upon an intelligent vacuum, but a being with what is virtually flesh and blood and bones, with organs, senses, dimensions, in some way analogous to our own."

174. Francis Galton also gave labor to the question at an early stage of his scientific career. In a recent number of *Nature*, a review of Karl Pearson's *Life of Galton* makes reference to his interest in a similar hypothesis, from which he seems to have been turned only by the superior call of his great work in heredity.

175. Another master of psycho-biology, Henry Rutgers Marshall, in *Instinct and Reason* (chapter II, p. 31) says: "If we assume that our preëminent consciousness is what it is because of the union in one system of what, but for this union, would have been inferior consciousnesses, why should we not also assume that our own preëminent consciousness may under certain conditions become attached to other consciousnesses, and together with them form a still higher type of consciousness?" He enlarges on the theme but checks himself as being "led afar into the dreamland of metaphysical suggestion, with which as psychologists we should have nothing to do," and of temptation "to carry this speculation much farther than would be appropriate in a work like this." Mr Marshall has not changed his view since so writing, though much has happened in the development of data since his words were penned, in 1898. Following the leading biologists of that day, he fully adopted the colonial view of cell and organ life,—that the life of each is independent, but contributable to the common stream of consciousness of the body of which they are cells or organs. The thoughts of (1) a coalescence of our individual consciousness with

others, and (2) of the formation of a "higher" consciousness were natural consequences. In chapter VII. he discusses "that argument by analogy which leads to the conclusion that the social aggregates of individuals in whom social instincts appear must be themselves organic in their nature." He agrees to the possibility of such existence as a high "social consciousness," but asks "what reason have we to believe that our elemental thought can in any way grasp the content of this hypothetical social consciousness." Yet he "believes that social organization of a lower type exists."

176. One of the most striking views is contained in the *History of Vitalism* of Professor Hans Driesch, formerly of Heidelberg, now of Leipzig. After an historical account of vitalism, ancient and modern,—including the newest phase, Neo-vitalism, under which heading he places his own system,—he devotes a chapter to what he terms "The Problem of *Supra*personal Individuality," and asks: "May we at least suppose philogeny" (descent) "to be a suprapersonal evolution?" He replies: "We may, but only for very general and undetermined reasons. We have no warranted system of biological species. . . . Of history we can say a little more, because we are in the midst of it . . . but we cannot and shall never be able to appreciate in clearness its evolutionary character. What could an embryonic cell, say of one of the germ layers, know about the 'evolutionary unity, of which it is a part if we could endow it with the faculties of sensation and reasoning?" It would at highest "suppose," in a hypothetical manner, that such a unity exists. And we are in the place of the reasoning embryonic cell with regard to suprapersonal unity. "And yet there are some peculiar features in 'history,' or rather in the human community, that seem to give us some signs of supra-individual totality. The first of these signs is the general biological fact of propagation. The second is what Wundt called 'the heterogeny of purpose', *i.e.*, the fact that human action may have quite different effects than what the agent 'affected,' so to speak, in a creative manner. The third sign of suprapersonal personality is *morality*, or rather the fact of moral feeling in the widest sense of the word," *i.e.*, that the hypothesis of mankind being a suprapersonal unity may really explain morality. He fears that "apart from the signs of unity spoken of, we are not able to say anything more in detail about the evolutionary character of history."

177. Although he posits an "entelechy" derived from Aristotle, and is rather indefinite, I think it evident that by '*supra*personality,' Professor Driesch means '*super*-personality,' as we would understand it. It is, it is true, a limited superpersonality that he thus favors, but the implications for a wider view, covering the whole of evolution, are plain. '*Supra*personal' would seem to us to imply '*beyond* personality.' A general revision of the existing definitions of 'superpersonal,' 'superpersonality,' 'suprapersonal,' and 'suprapersonality' would seem to be due in the interests of exactitude. That of 'superpersonality' even in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, could be improved. It does not mention '*supra*personality.' It ascribes 'superpersonality' to "God or the Absolute," and refers to F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. But Bradley refuses to identify God with the Absolute, and calls the latter superpersonal. The composite conscious creature of all terrestrial life posited by the writers first mentioned, is neither the Absolute nor God in any sense.

178. Henri Bergson, in his aspect of an acute, though discursive Neo-vitalist, and on whom as such has fallen much of the mantle of Schopenhauer, drops certain observations from time to time, which seem scarcely in accord with his main theories, but rather indicate approaches to superpersonality. It is true that, as expressed by his friend, H. Wildon Carr, in the preface to the translation of *L'Énergie Sjirituelle*, he holds that "a dynamic concept of psychical reality has replaced the older concept of mind, which identified it with awareness or consciousness, . . . the principle that the great factor in evolution is a kind of unconsciousness." But that view, descended from Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, is contradicted by almost the next words:—"mind is not a phenomenon which flares up out of nothing and relapses into nothing." And it is especially incompatible with the nature of affective feeling so largely involved in the process. Later, he says (p. 33) that "it is to social life that evolution leads, as though the need of it was felt from the beginning." And "the more we become accustomed to *the idea of a consciousness overflowing the organism* the more natural we find it to suppose that the soul survives the body" (p. 97). And "it is as if *a vague and formless being* whom we may call, as we will, man or *superman, had sought to realize himself*."[1]

[1] *L'Évolution Créatrice*, translated by H. Wildon Carr, p. 280.

179. Where Vitalists display tendencies to super-personalism the indication is a strong one that natural science points that way, for their strong point, in their newest forms, is their alliance with scientific methods. On the other hand they have a great weakness, since all Vitalists, starting as they do from 'mind-stuffs,' 'entelechies,' 'unconsciousnesses,' 'unconscious physical states' and other low-consciousness bases, can only be expected to explain with difficulty the higher reaches of consciousness. "It is of the essence of vitalism," writes Dr. Fraser Harris, "to explain life in terms of the less known."

180. Another source of indications in favor of super-personality is the Psychoanalysts. Though occupied so largely with practical aspects of the subconscious and so-called 'unconscious,' and though prone at times, like Dr. Freud, to interpretations decidedly open to demurrer, they have contributed much to an insight into the strange components and genetic origins of both the normal and the abnormal mind,—of what in fact may be styled the consciousness of the protoplasmic race. And they have done more than thus help to take us back to our immortality of descent, the unbrokenness and width of our ancient life: for the doctrine of the Censor, or Guide, is distinctly superpersonal. So is that of "the collective unconscious," — the "Something-akin-to-consciousness-of-which-the-doer-is-unaware-and-which-determines-behavior, and determines also thoughts and feelings."[2]

181. A similar sense of a felt want may be inferred from the growing protests of many biologists against the mechanistic view of life as inadequate to explain the versatilities of living substances. Professor J. S. Haldane of Oxford, the leader in such protests, speaks of "the error of the old conception of people as mere units existing independently of one another. The new psychology—the psychology of the future—teaches us that they really exist as the manifestations of a spiritual reality which pervades them and all around them. This is diametrically opposed to the mechanistic theology which was the counterpart of the mechanistic science, but is of the very essence of true religion. An isolated individual organism is merely a scientific abstraction; and we are already learning to realize this. The man of the future will un-

[2]Eden and Cedar Paul, Preface to Baudoin's *Studies in Psychoanalysis*, 1923.

derstand it and shape his conduct by this new conception of the biological behavior of individual human organisms to other human organisms and the rest of their environment. But when we look beyond mere biology to psychology, which is the branch of knowledge dealing with conscious behavior, we see that we bring in the most intimate sense of our environment, and that the environment is in reality a spiritual one."[3]

182. We have thus the following elements of support for superpersonality as a subject worthy of present study:

1. The serious attention given to it independently by Galton, Marshall, Butler, Driesch, and other men distinguished in evolutionary thought.

2. Inferences to be drawn from expressions of Bergson and his school of philosophy.

3. Inferences from the Psychoanalysts,—especially doctrines of the Censor, the Guide, and 'the collective unconscious.'

4. Inferences from the humanistic protests of eminent present day biologists, based upon the marvellous peculiarities of living substances.

183. Other inferences might be added from the broad operations of instinct.

184. The question which is the point of this chapter may now be put: *Whether these elements do not indicate that a juncture is arrived at which justifies the treatment of superpersonality as a scientific hypothesis?* Ought it not now to be taken from the station hitherto assigned it in "the dreamland of conjecture" and given fuller scrutiny? Are we not too narrowly interpreting life, morality, human nature, natural science, from the point of view of the traditional individual? Is he not larger and greater and more wonderful? How can self-sacrifice and martyrdom for others be explained from the point of view of that individual? Or the adjustments for our happiness provided by the 'unconscious' functions of the body? Or those concerned in the preservation of the race? Are not these, and many other mysteries, solved by a larger, superpersonal movement?

[3] *London Chronicle*, interview, 1925. Professor Haldane's "*Mechanism, Life and Personality*" (Murray, 1914), sets forth his own theory.

CHAPTER X.

Hobhouse's Theory of Mental Evolution.

185.—Mind in Evolution.—186. "Instinct precedes Intelligence"?—187. Hobhouse's form of "Instinct".—188. Growth of "Mind".—192. "Mind may be the driving force of Evolution".—193. Rejects the Organic Analogy. Exalts the individual.—194. "Harmony the final purpose".—195. What is his "Mind"?—196. Criticisms.

185. Of the two greatest philosophic works in English on Psychological Evolution,—*Instinct and Intelligence,* by Henry Rutgers Marshall, may be said to represent the best fruit of American thought, as it stood a generation ago, and philosophically it still holds primacy. Marshall's attitude to the "cell analogy" view of the human individual, which involves the fundamental principle of our Superpersonalism, that the directive power is outside of the individual—was vague, but an enormous quantity of biological data has appeared since its publication which renders our position more probable.

The other work, Professor Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse's *Mind in Evolution,* may in like manner be said to represent the fruit of recent thought in Great Britain. Each gives generous tribute to fellow-thinkers and has liberally accepted their aid.

186. From Professor Hobhouse's Preface to his first edition in 1901, it appears that his conception of mental evolution was first formed about 1886, and, being gradually modified, most closely corresponded to that of Lester Ward's *Outlines of Sociology,* published in 1898. In his second edition (1915), the substance of the book remains unchanged, but several parts are rewritten. He says: "We shall not endeavour to trace the origin of Mind out of something that is not Mind. We shall take it as a factor in organic evolution which we shall endeavor to trace backwards to its germ, and forward to its mature development, ascertaining at the same time its relation to the other factors. . . . . What bearing those investigations may have on the nature of Mind, its origin in the organic

world, or its functions in the whole of things, are questions on which our results must speak for themselves." He remarks that "the normal tendency of evolution is not towards a higher, but a divergent type. In the resulting diversity, old types survive, and there is a deterioration as well as an improvement. But one line leads "upwards", —Orthogenic evolution, the growth of Mind. "the ordering, correlating, harmonizing agent. The organism which is gifted with intelligence shows it by arranging its actions on a certain plan. It adapts means to ends . . . . . Its scheme of action may include the good of its young, of its mate, or its friends, along with its own. . . . . And the organization may include several individuals, a pair of mates, a community, or conceivably a whole species." Instinct precedes Intelligence and "brings the experience not merely of the individual, but the race, to bear on the problems which the race must solve." Hence it serves well the needs of the lower living forms. "But the whole process of Orthogenic Evolution consists in the gradual replacement of instinct by reason, and it is the final goal of reason to do precisely what is ascribed to Instinct above,—to bring all the experience of the race to bear in organizing the whole life of the race. That Instinct is a basis for the adjustment and coordination of action unsurpassed in its own way we cannot deny. And along with Instinct we must here class all that belongs to the hereditary structure of the organism,—a wider conception than that of Instinct in the strict sense. . . . . Neither Intelligence nor Instinct explains all cases of adaptation. A measure of adaptability is the common character of all living organic matter. We find it in plants no less than animals, in protozoa no less than in mammals. This adaptability gives to the reactions of organisms the appearance of purpose." And he observes on the well-known tendency of even mutilated parts to if possible reconstruct the whole.

187. "If Mind is the highest thing," he proceeds, "Orthogenic Evolution must consist in the unfolding of all that there is of latent possibility in Mind, the awakening of its powers, the development of its scope. . . . . Not all organized action is intelligent. But all unorganized action is, just as far as organization is lacking, unintelligent."

"Now Instinct . . . . . is not, when fully defined, to be taken as exclusive of Intelligence. On the contrary, their relations are closely and subtly woven. But we shall put

the criticism in more radical fashion by *substituting for Instinct* the conception of *hereditary physical structure* acting in accordance with mechanical laws. Every living being,, it may be said, possesses such a structure. It has grown up bit by bit. . . . . *every variation that helped to keep the organism alive, and to perpetuate the stock, being preserved, while every adverse change* is weeded out by the destruction of the stock it entails." He illustrates by the mechanism responses of the cat's spring at sight of the mouse, "but purpose as a conscious process in the cat has no causal efficiency; what works is the physical system" . . . . . "But the processes of Mind are not machine-like but mental." He does not admit the obvious analogy of the two processes, and his further distinctions are not convincing. "Instinct," he says later, "is merely one aspect of the evolution of structure. The more mechanical instincts approximate to compound reflexes. But in true instinct, behavior is *governed by a persistent interest to the service of which* action is adapted."

(Is not a pertinent question "How can a mechanical structure have a "persistent interest"? Just what kind of a thing can pursue, and govern by, a persistent interest? It would surely be a conscious agent having a certain kind of power. Dr. Hobhouse himself raises the question in another place. Is not "hereditary structure" rather the deposit of willed action?)

188. In his closing chapter (XIX.) headed "Self-conscious Development", he says: "Our object in the present work has been to ascertain the character and functions of *Mind as the originating principle of Evolution.* . . . . . The fact that biological evolution rests on a struggle for existence is itself enough to show a *want of that organic unity in which the good of one part is necessarily the good of the rest.* Evolution by natural selection is thus the strict negation of an organic growth. . . . . It is an irregular, backward and forward movement. . . . . This is not development. It is more like a slow process of sifting. . . . . *no comprehensive plan or pervading tendency.* . . . . The development of Mind in animals and man means the gradual introduction of a higher principle of organization into this relatively chaotic state.

189. (Here one might question whether biological evolution necessarily "rests on a struggle for existence." Doubtless the struggle arrived when crowding began, but there must have been a long period when there was plenty

of nutrition for the earliest form or few forms, and another principle than struggle governed that stage of movement, as the results show, and that forward movement shows a "pervading tendency", and even a "comprehensive plan" seems logically thinkable).

190. "But", he says, "should we not rather compare it" (the evolution by Mind) "to a purpose executed by human forethought? . . . . . It is a self-conscious evolution *having a purpose towards which it steadily makes its way.* . . . . . The development in its highest stage is beyond doubt purposive." We can attribute it to the beings taking part therein, or outside the process to a hypothetical Being who contrives the whole movement. "The latter alternative would bring us to the conception of an unconditioned creation of the world order, which can never be accepted by the intelligence without stifling the moral sense. *Is there a third possibility?*"

191. In another passage, in Chapter 11, Hobhouse asks again whether vital processes are to be referred to *some wholly distinct agent neither mechanical nor teleological*, such as Driesch's "entelechy"? (The present writer holds that a superpersonal agent is indicated.) Hobhouse's general solution is that "Origin and purpose are mutually dependent parts of one scheme". . . . . "the germ of a soul in a living organism". . . . . the working out here "of the vaster process which we dimly conceive as constituting the essential life of the world."

192. In his Preface of 1915 he further adds: "In the years which have elapsed since the first edition was published, comparative Psychology has undergone a great change. Owing to the activity of a group of workers in the American universities, the investigation of the animal mind has, roughly within this period, established for itself a place among the recognized sciences. . . . In particular the observations of H. S. Jennings have shown me that something of the nature of Mind is to be carried further down in the organic world than I supposed. His results, together with other work in general psychology, have led me however to extend rather than to narrow the view taken in the first edition, and even to raise the quesion whether Mind ,in the infinitely varied forms of its activity, from the groping of unconscious effort, to the full clearness of conscious purpose) *may not be the essential driving force in all evolutionary change.* In any case, the

revolution which has overtaken biological theory during the same period is profound. Its significance is as yet imperfectly grasped, but it will, I believe, be found, as time goes on, to have invested the constitution of the living being, as against the environing conditions, with a new importance, and in this constitution the fundamental fact everywhere is that the living being is not passive but active, not mechanical in its reactions to things, but assertive, plastic, and, in a measure proportionate to its development, self-determining. If this is so, psychology will in the future, have a larger part to play than has hitherto been supposed, in the study of the rise and decay of forms of life."

193. In 1924, in his volume on "Social Development, Its Nature and Conditions", which must be regarded as a writing on a form of the same subject, he says: "Essentially the subject-matter of Sociology is the interaction of individual minds each in a manner cased in its own shell, forever divided from its nearest, yet reaching out to one another, responding and craving responses, cooperating willingly and unwillingly, consciously and unconsciously, yet at the same time jostling, thrusting one another aside, trampling down the weaker, with partial aims vividly realized and deeper common needs imperfectly understood, *moving in the mass on lines which no foresight of theirs has traced,* yet not without eventual power of self-guidance and an emergent vision of the true goal." In the enduring community the various classes each carry on their avocation, not thinking of very much beyond them, "and in the broad result the community gets itself clothed and fed and kept in passable health and peace." It maintains itself like an organism, and each member sees something beyond himself. "These facts have suggested the famous *organic analogy.* The community is thought of as an organism related to its constituent individuals as the individual is himself related to the cells of his own body. So stated, the *analogy falls, because the community,* is composed of *members having powers of self-direction* which the cells of the body do not possess, *while conversely the individual has a body which is normally one,* in contrast to the plurality of minds in the community, which, however they agree, remain of necessity distinct. In the pursuit of the organic analogy, some stress has been laid on the divisions within the individual consciousness, multiple individuality and the like. It

overlooks the fact that *to society plurality of persons* is essential and its development lies, not in overleaping the bounds but in giving to each distinct personality its full value. To personality on the other hand, division is the reverse of necessary and its development lies rather in the direction, among other things, of a completer unity." The community then is not an organism, if to be an organism means for it to be *an enlarged animal—a great leviathan.*" He regards the idea of "an organic interdependence" of individual members as preferable. "In the physical world the whole is primary and in the main determines the parts, while in social relationships the parts are primary and combine to constitute the whole." He decides that *society rests upon the development of individuals.* "The analysis of sociological laws reveals in society *no superhuman monster*, but only human beings," and he sees "no cause of progress except in the human mind and will."

194. His final conclusion is that "Social development, as here understood, is an integral part of a much more far-reaching process. Mind as we know it in experience has its first humble manifestations in the lowest germs of life. . . . . In man, cooperation becomes the dominant factor, and as it overcomes its original limitations, we see Mind developing towards a true unity. This unity is *gravely misunderstood when conceived as a merging of the individual centres in which consciousness has lived from the beginning.* It is rather a unity of the true organic type which preserves and develops the constituent units in the plenitude of their individual power; *for the final purpose*, which becomes clearer as rational development proceeds, is to *make a harmony of life*, and the nature of this harmony is not to destroy but to fulfil all that can be fulfilled without mutual destruction or arrest. . . . . It *is the aim, not of the human mind in particular, but of Mind as such.*" Failures may occur. "But underlying every effort . . . . . is that unresting impulse of Mind to the fulfilment of its being, which in its repeated impacts on limiting conditions, holds the secret of development in every field."

195. Now, having tried to state Hobhouse's theory at length, and fully remembering that he does not pretend "to trace the origin of Mind", my hope is to succeed in suggesting some things that should come out of it. And first let us note the following expressions:

That Orthogenic Evolution is the growth of Mind;

That the organism gifted with intelligence adapts means to ends;

That it may include the good of others in its plans, (*i.e.*, see and feel beyond the individual);

That this organism may include several individuals, or even a whole species;

That their adaptability gives all organisms their appearance of purpose;

That Mind means the introduction of a high principle of organisation, *i.e.*, systematic purpose;

That Mind may be "*the essential driving force* in all evolutionary change";

That the living being is not mechanical but self-determining;

That the reparatory process in living organisms is apparently unconscious;

That evolutionary purpose resembles human forethought;

That there may be *a wholly distinct agent*, neither mechanical nor teleological, at work;

That Mind aims "to make a harmony of life."

Since he refers Orthogenic Evolution to the general intelligently directing agent which he calls Mind, we have a right to ask ourselves what he really means by Mind? Does it follow this "purpose resembling human forethought" as a *conscious person*, and if so, what kind of a person? If he means a low-consciousness, diffused vitalistic power, as he apparently does in his theory of its origin, is that not insufficient? Apparently Hobhouse has not noted this insufficiency, for his answer appears in his reasons for rejecting "the organic analogy." They do not cover an organic concept which implies a superpersonality directing individuals psychically from without and within as contributing "cell-lives" in a larger organic whole. On the contrary, he adopts as the only solution of the evolutionary present and future, (and therefore of the past) an "interdependence" of individuals, having mutual needs, the individual being the primary element in the combination, and that the future of evolution depends on development of human individuals, their minds and wills. Apparently the "organic analogy" he has in mind was not one developed as a broad evolutionary hypothesis of all

life,—but rather in the metaphorical sense of Spencer and the imperfect hypothesis of Réné Worms,—both restricted to sociology,—or he might have thought it more worthy of discussion. What strikes the writer is that the true completion of his theory of mental history might have been found along the broader line. His "Mind" as a "driving-force" demands *superpersonal* explanations: it hangs in the air.

196. Take some of his principal propositions:

1. *That the individuals composing human societies are "members having powers of self-direction."*

(a) How much power of self-direction have they, when we consider that something like three quarters of the actions of the most independent individuals are automatic and subconscious?

(b) How much does even the conscious remainder direct? Is not still a large percentage of it really suggested by events and influences from outside the individual?

(c) Whence comes the human "self-directing power" in any event? Is not all received from inheritance that does not come from environment?

(d) What, in fact directs this "power of self-direction"? In short, is it not evident that the matter of self-direcion cannot be adequately considered for human individuals separately from their whole evolutionary history? Human civilization occupies an infinitesimal fraction of the life-time of the protoplasmic race, during the whole rest of which nothing like free human purpose existed, yet the race's preservation and progress were marvellously cared for by something else.

2. *That the individuals of society are primary.* Is it necessary to remark that "primary" is a relative and elastic term in the elusive matter of individuality.

3. *That the human individual is physically a separate unity.* But is not each cell of every cell-colony also a separate unit? Some are linked together by bands of protein tissue and others are not. And are not such free cells as the white blood-corpuscles each physically a separate unit when guided by some mysterious directing power, they hurry to battle with invading bacteria? And after all, are there not all-enveloping physical connections, in the ether and the atmosphere, between all living in-

dividuals? No physical body exists that is absolutely disconnected from any other.

4. *That a plurality of individuals is essential to society.* Does not this beg the question? Is not a plurality implied in the definition of society? Every cell-colony is a plurality of individuals. But perhaps Hobhouse means that society is only a construct of individuals. If so, are there not things in it, like voluntary martyrdom, which no mere construct of individuals can explain?

5. *That the development of society resides in giving to each individual his full value.* What produces that giving? Must it not be a power beyond any individual?

6. *That "the organic analogy" implies "a superhuman monster".* This opprobious designation is doubtless an answer to some very poor form of analogy. In one or more forms, the inclusive superbeing posited is God. Is God therefore a superhuman monster? And why should any lesser being to whom such beneficent operations are mediately attributed be regarded as a "monster"?

7. *That Instinct is not to be taken as a form of Intelligence but a development of structure.* And yet Intelligence grows out of "Instinct"! And what of those new discoveries of intelligence in insects by Pictet, Cheesman, the Peckhams and Williston?

8. *That the future of evolution depends on the development of human individuals.* Is it not rather to be expected that human minds, wills and efforts will arrive at a limit, while the directive Power—whatever it is—will continue directing long after man has passed into the shades of time? In my belief, the sole hope of the world for the future, is in that directive Power.

Finally, can any human individuals attain such action as will account for the following facts:

(a)the great outstanding fact of *the independence of Instinct* (using the term in its broadest sense)? where it disregards the individual and acts without him;

(b) the great outstanding fact of *the general helplessness of the individual*, and the brevity of his life;

(c) the successes of the evolutionary process during the vast past and the vast spatial present, without intelligent aid from the individual;

(d) *the ingenuity of the innumerable contrivances* which favor joy and avoid pain, through all the history of terrestrial life.

197. The individual is doubtless a factor, and a great one, but not relatively great as a directing factor. Nor is he the only factor. The community is a factor. In existing forms man is both an individual and a community. Behind them both, is somewhere the real directing power, since neither of them accounts for the results. Then must not that which Hobhouse terms Mind be larger than his definition? Must it not be a Power conscious of what it "drives" towards? Must it not be deeper and wider than any individual or known combination of individuals? What is the meaning underlying his phrases "moving the mass on lines which no foresight of theirs has traced," "confident that there must be some unity which holds the jarring elements together", and "to make a harmony of life is the aim not of the human mind in particular but of Mind as such", and "that unresting impulse of Mind to the fulfilment of its being"? These are surely phrases descriptive of a superpersonal conscious unity. Such questions have been asked in the interests of ultimate Theism. But are they not descriptions of the more terrestrial spirit of evolution itself, guiding not only Mind but Instinct and the things that were before either, to "a harmony of life"? What is means by that "harmony"? It must mean something tangible like happiness, or else it is a hollow word.

CHAPTER XO.

The Organic Analogy

198.—Herbert Spencer. Benjamin Kidd.—199. Réné Worms' Organisme et Société.—200. Definitions and objections.—204. Durkheim. Duguit.—205. Strong and weak points.—206. Comparison with Superpersonalism..

198. The Organic, or Biological, Analogy, is the hypothesis wherein "the community is thought of as an organism, related to its constituent individuals as the individual is himself related to the cells of his own body." This Analogy, although argued as though limited to Sociology, has a larger application. It has resemblances to that part of the Outer Consciousness, or Superpersonalist, theory which treats each living individual—including the human, and all living individuals, and all interworking groups of them,—as related to the Person of Evolution, on the same general principle as a constituent cell and its mind to the human body and mind: in other words the principle of *coloniality*. And to bare coloniality the Outer Consciousness theory adds coalescence of consciousness. The controversy which took place over the general principle of the Analogy around Herbert Spencer's essay on "The Social Organism" is critically summarized in Benjamin Kidd's article, "Sociology" in the present Encyclopædia Britannica. A more complete survey is the article "Representative Biological Theories of Society," by A. E. Barnes, in the *Sociological Review* for April—July—October, 1925. Hobhouse, we saw, leans to the primacy of the individual over the community, in their relations: Kidd champions that of "the social process," as the completion of Evolutionary natural selection. And he points out that no individual lives long enough to affect more than a small part of the process. This agrees with our objections regarding Hobhouse's stress on the individual,—the objections of the helplessness and mortality of the individual. Kidd dismisses the early crude forms of the Analogy as being strained attempts to find all kinds of mere likenesses between the cell and the society, and mentions especially the work of the Austrian Dr. Schaeffle as extreme and

fanciful. The Analogy was most uncompromisingly advanced at that time by the learned Réné Worms, editor of *La Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, in his book *"Organisme et Société"*, Paris, 1896. I propose to discuss his theory briefly, like Hobhouse's, from the larger point of view of our Superpersonalism.

199. He begins his Introduction with the proposition that "sociology is founded on the same fundamental prin- "ciples as the physiological, chemical and biological "sciences. From cosmology to sociology we can pass only "by biology, which is thus the closest to sociology. Hence "our problem is: what is the contribution of biology to "sociology? It is double. We must consider the living "beings who are its members; and the bond which unites "them, the laws which preside over their life in common. "As to the living beings, that study is already made by "the biologist." As to the bond, "we answer without "hesitation Yes, biology can there also teach us." (Thus far Worms is dealing in generalities.) "The relations "which exist between the elements of the organism exist "also between the elements of the society. . . . . the broad "traits of the type 'organism' are likewise in the type "society'. The anatomy, the physiology, the pathology, "of societies reproduce in large the anatomy, the physi- "ology, the pathology, of organisms, with important addi- "tions but in the end on the same fundamental theme. How "could it be otherwise? The society is composed of in- "dividuals who are organisms as the organism itself is "composed of individuals of lower order, which are cells. "Why should the superior individuals, the organisms, act, "in the body of the society they form, otherwise than as "the subordinate individuals, the cells, act in the body of "the organism itself?" Here he may be taken as stating his special proposition, a bold and ingenious one.

He proceeds to further definition, but is still indefinite: *"Consequently the society itself is analogous to the organ- "ism.* It is not simply an organism, it is more: being more "complex, it may be termed a *supraorganism.* But, in- "cluding more than an organism it first comprises all that "an organism includes. An incomplete idea of it would "be given by saying that it is an organism, but a false idea "by denying that it is one. To define it exactly, one must "recognize that it is an organism with something essential- "ly more. Such is at least our conception of the nature "of societies; such is the proposition of this book." He

says the theory is much discussed, but that it tends to prevail, although some of the most eminent discutants refuse to accept it, at least in full, among whom he mentions Letourneau, Tarde and Schaeffle. Comte, as the founder of sociology, had originated the phrase "l'organisme social." And he called Humanity *le Grand Etre.*

Herbert Spencer also (Principles of Sociology §§220-222), had set forth the Analogy "but he is essentially an individualist and wishes above all to save the anatomy of the human being." First Spencer holds that the social organism is *discontinuous,* while the living being is continuous. "And above all, that the parts of the social body "are *conscious,* but not those of the individual body." (Spencer would not have asserted to-day that the cells are not conscious.) "Therefore in the organism the ends "of the cells are subordinate to the welfare of their whole, "while the society can have no other end than to assure "the happiness of its members: there the parts live for "the whole, here the whole lives for the parts."

Worms proceeds: Several authors give the cell theory in part, but Monsieur Lilienfield alone, in *La société humaine considérée comme organisme reëlle* makes it the theme of a book. Lilienfield was a student of Worms. The latter proposes to demonstrate the falsity of the proposition that "there is no unity superior to the individual: the society is nothing of itself." He proposes to prove it to be "a being which lives by them, but which nevertheless lives for itself" and that "the relation between the society and the organism is analogous, (we do not yet say identical), to that between the organism and the cell; that the society, though made of organisms, is not less a real being than the organism made of cells."

200. His First Chapter is entitled "Definitions and General Comparison of the Organism and the Society." His definitions of the society are artificial and partial. He labours out a theory of what constitutes a nation, and hypostatises its mass thought as an organic life. More incisive is his Second Chapter, entitled "Objections and Answers." First he takes up the objection that "*The individual alone exists.*" He points out the composite nature of the human individual: "real unity is inseparable from multiplicity." Yet he does not show that real unity actually accompanies the multiplicity of society, nor that its unity is the same as that of the man, especially in the respect of consciousness.

201. The second objection he combats is: *"that the elements of a living body cannot live when isolated."* He disproves this objection by biological examples, such as arthropods which regrow lost limbs, and certain creatures whose parts, after division continue as wholes.

202. The third objection is: *"that in the organized being, there is continuity of living substance," but not in society.* Worms appeals to the continuity of man's *milieu,* the air, the world, etc. But he unfortunately adds what is not so convincing, that "what constitutes the continuity of the society is at the same time the economic interdependence created among its members by the division of labor, and the similarity of nature which exists between them;" and he mentions their differences of race, of origin, and so on. "The most marvellous type of continuity is the telepathy of two hearts across spaces." But if continuity of *milieu* and perhaps even sympathy of hearts give some reply to the objection of lack of continuity of living substance, is not division of labor mere cooperation, and the similarities of bodily and mental nature no more than simple addition? He might have added, to better purpose, the complex bond between the eye, the mind, and the object seen, and that between the ear, the mind and the violin.

203. The fourth objection is: *"that human society is composed of individuals conscious and free."* He justly answers that man is only partly conscious and free,—that he is largely unconscious, and his freedom is very limited. Freedom he regards as "simply the *ensemble* of "our own nature, the ensemble of the tendencies we have "received from our ancestors or acquired in our own per-"sonal lives: heredity and adaptation explain all the "elements. . . . . It is not possible that organic government "has not as its end, like social government, the greatest "welfare possible of the greatest number of the governed." I think this statement correct and important.

204. In Chapter Four "The Elements and the Form of the Social Body," he returns to an artificial and narrow definition of "society", as "a durable group of individuals exercising all their activity in common." He is unconvincing in this and the next two chapters "The Social Cell", and "Various Groups of Social Cells". But in Chapter Ten, he says "If the individual thinks the society, it is "not that he creates it, but it that truly thinks in him. . . .

"We are thus led to believe that every human being at "the same time that he conceives himself as an 'I', perceives "his bond with other men, sees himself member of a col- "lectivity, as fragment of a whole, to which he owes him- "self. This idea has been simultaneously expressed "lately by several sociologists. M. Durkheim has remarked "it, ... M. Duguit has stated it the most clearly. 'Every "individual consciousness', he writes, 'is at each instant "of its psychic life, *double*. This duplication of the con- "scious personality is a normal and permanent fact. Man "has always at the same time consciousness of his own "personality, and consciousness of the collectivity of which "he forms a part. He grasps it in the same moment as "individual and as social cell." Duguit also reasons that the social was the earlier form, from alleged facts regarding primitive man; and he remarks that great discoveries are often simultaneously arrived at by several independent observers, such as the discovery of Neptune by Leverrier and Adams.

Worms ultimately exclaims: "Has then the society a true personality? we have no doubt of it!" But his illustrations again fail him, because his concept of a society is that of a group, and he is driven to such examples as the rage of crowds, their cruelty, their mass psychology.

205. In conclusion Worms sums up his arguments. The total showing is unsatisfactory, and justifies Hobhouse's rejection of that form of the Analogy. His weak points are: the citation of superficial similarities; the artificial nature of his concept of a "society"; his failure to adduce evidence that society has a true central consciousness; and his attainment at best of the vaguest kind of a vitalism. His strong points are his grasp of a general unity of plan between the cell and society; that he feels that the individual is too brief and limited to plan and achieve the beneficent successes of society; and he answers well such objections as that "the parts of a living body cannot live when isolated," and that society has a lack of physical continuity. To these points should be added the wide scope of his learning, and the adhesion of great minds to certain of his doctrines.

206. Our Superpersonalism resembles the Organic Analogy in its doctrine that the protoplasmic race, is a living unit, of which all its individuals are organs; and that the individual cell and that living unit act on the same organic plan. Where Superpersonalism differs is

in holding that the whole of that race is inspired by an indwelling independent, directive Superperson—the Person of Evolution. Its principle is this superpersonal direction,—not a mere unit principle, nor a mere mass addition of units, nor a simple uniting principle, but a directive, organically unifying principle. In that sense Worms unconsciously spoke the language of Superpersonalism when he said: "Si l'individu pense la société, ce n'est pas qu'il la crée, c'est que veritablement elle pense en lui." And Superpersonalism does not confine the principle to analogy of structure between the cell and "society": it sees organicity as the universal principle of life.

CHAPTER XII.

Conclusions.

207. It now remains to sum up the hypothesis sketched in this book. The chief fact on which it is grounded is *the independence of Instinct*, regarding Instinct as an element coterminous with all the reactions of living substance, including their psychical concomitants, for these cannot be neglected, as behaviorism suggests.

208. The second fact is the close association of Instinct with the law of action towards joy and in avoidance of pain: and we have concluded that, if regarded from the superpersonal, not the individual, point of view, all its conduct,—which is equivalent to *all* conduct,—can be explained by the application of this law.

209. This leading to an examination of the nature of purpose, involves an analysis of teleology, with the conclusion that persistent production of joy is the only true teleological argument. Nothing is more striking in advancing biology than this persistence through unimaginable intricacies.

210. Next, the welling-up in us of purposive impulses from that Outer fountain of conscious life renders necessary an interpretation of the connection of consciousnesses Our explanation is an axiom: that every conscious unit has a power of coalescing its consciousness with, and of decoalescing it from, that of other conscious units or groups, under certain conditions.

211. Preprotoplasmic and cosmic speculative extensions of the theory are natural sequences. But the distinctive method of the system is induction. And, recognizing also the advantages of intellectualistic, intuitional, and perhaps some emblematic and mystical systems, it makes no claim to exclusiveness as a system, but can take its place in a fit synthesis.

212. The colonial view of the human individual is a necessary link. Each living thing is constantly in touch

of some kind with the whole universe. (I hold it is in *conscious* touch). The impact of that huge series of stimuli on each of the bodily colony of trillions of cells resembles immeasurable touches, changing every instant, on a sensitive musical instrument of uncountable keys. The effect as we know it in our ordinary consciousness, is the harmonious music (or sometimes incomprehensible discord) of the personal complex experience. There is also other music, such as floats unheard by us, in the vastness of the realms of radio. The entire scale of known vibrations is played upon, from the longest Wireless Kilometers down through the Hertzians and the microns of visible light, to the infinitesimal Angstroms of the cosmic rays. And to these must be added at both ends of the scale their extensions of the great and small ether-waves towards the perhaps infinitely great and the infinitely small. These constant touches on our living substance each contribute to our affective consciousness and form the insensible shades of Value which are so elusive to the purely introspective method. They must not only be counted on in their effects within the human individual, but also on the Outer Superperson in which the larger things of our being are transacted. Thus we are adjusted to and bound up with the universe. All events are brought before this collective affective tribunal, measured at their exact worth and deflected towards joy. Such is our real life.

213. What is that directive power which urges the whole process—which everywhere urges the individual to act for the whole, preferably to (as well as subsidiarily for) the individual? What are the nature and scope of the independent Instinct? What is its meaning in the altruistic impulse? Why and how is the mass preferred to its constituent cell: the more complex cell-combination individual to the less complex; the organism to the limb; the family, the nation, the herd, to the individual member; the protoplasmic race to any partial race; the many in general to the one or the few, among equals? The principle is evidently one fundamental to Organism. And it is *affective*. Is the living organism the model of the make-up of the known universe? Le Dantec says that "Nature uses very few models." At the other end of the dimensional scale, do the molecule of a protein, and its constituent atoms follow the same law of subjection to some mass interest of the substance of which they are components?

It seems as if ionization were a concomitant of the event. There are some pertinent questions of this kind involved in the actions of chromosomes and genes, and in the electrical nature of things shewn by the new chemistry and physics. Is the joy-and-pain law the psychic side of the whole process, both vast and minute? Is it the inside? Is organic equilibrium not correlate to joy? And subsidiary to it? This is now a key question of philosophy.

214. Our Superpersonalism offers comprehensible explanations of these and of other familiar problems. Reasoning and instinct, intuition and genuine faith (not credulity) are all forms of one process. Utilitarian and intuitional ethics are reconciled. Truth, goodness and beauty are not separate values, impossible of analysis, but are related on the basis of joy, the sole basis of value. Immortality is secure for us in the Person of Evolution, our deeper self.

215. Can we look into the future? There likewise Superpersonalism answers to some effect. Will the Person of Evolution not certainly continue to pursue his work of increasing happiness,—that work which is the law of his being? Must he not continue inventing improvements to attain it? Will he not, as hitherto, continue the higher types of life as his organs? Will he not withdraw the useless inferior? Must he not only strive but succeed? For is he not of the universe and has he not shown the power to become its victor and governor?

Need man then have any fear for the evolutionary future? The amœba lost the lead, but the metazoon took it up; the metazoon lost the foremost place, the trilobite succeeded; the fish replaced the trilobite type; the reptile next took the forefront; the mammals "went one better"; man at length replaced the failing rule of the higher brutes. They were all forms of one spirit; and when man in his turn shall fail and his terrestrial form go down among the fossil strata, shall that spirit not take on more glorious forms of body, mind and heart, ever advancing in oneness with the Person of Evolution. Is then not Pain a disappearing cloud and death everywhere an illusion?

Sources.

Although the distinctive thoughts in the present work are not derived from others, the books, old and new, which have helped in its making are too many to list here. A number have been mentioned in the text. If several should be thought quoted too fully, my object has been to give their ideas fair play. Some authors not mentioned are: Sir William Osler, Th. Ribot, J. T. Merz, F. W. C. Myers, W. K. Clifford, Josiah Royce, G. T. W. Patrick, Joseph Needham, Ralph B. Perry, J. Arthur Thomson, F. C. Bartlett, G. Ellery Hale, J. N. Friend, E. L. Bouvier, P. Bovet, A. B. Macallum, C. Dayton Miller, F. C. S. Schiller, C. Lloyd Morgan, T. Hunt Morgan, J. E. Boodin, Wm. McDougall, Louis V. King, and W. K. Wright.

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